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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
AUTOMATED NETWORK SECURITY WITH EXCEPTIONS USING SDN
Campus networks have recently experienced a proliferation of devices ranging from
personal use devices (e.g. smartphones, laptops, tablets), to special-purpose network
equipment (e.g. firewalls, network address translation boxes, network caches, load
balancers, virtual private network servers, and authentication servers), as well as
special-purpose systems (badge readers, IP phones, cameras, location trackers, etc.).
To establish directives and regulations regarding the ways in which these heteroge-
neous systems are allowed to interact with each other and the network infrastructure,
organizations typically appoint policy writing committees (PWCs) to create accept-
able use policy (AUP) documents describing the rules and behavioral guidelines that
all campus network interactions must abide by.
While users are the audience for AUP documents produced by an organiza-
tion’s PWC, network administrators are the responsible party enforcing the contents
of such policies using low-level CLI instructions and configuration files that are typi-
cally difficult to understand and are almost impossible to show that they do, in fact,
enforce the AUPs. In other words, mapping the contents of imprecise unstructured
sentences into technical configurations is a challenging task that relies on the inter-
pretation and expertise of the network operator carrying out the policy enforcement.
Moreover, there are multiple places where policy enforcement can take place. For ex-
ample, policies governing servers (e.g. web, mail, and file servers) are often encoded
into the server’s configuration files. However, from a security perspective, conflating
policy enforcement with server configuration is a dangerous practice because minor
server misconfigurations could open up avenues for security exploits. On the other
hand, policies that are enforced in the network tend to rarely change over time and are
often based on one-size-fits-all policies that can severely limit the fast-paced dynamics
of emerging research workflows found in campus networks.
This dissertation addresses the above problems by leveraging recent advances
in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) to support systems that enable novel in-
network approaches developed to support an organization’s network security policies.
Namely, we introduce PoLanCO, a human-readable yet technically-precise policy lan-
guage that serves as a middle-ground between the imprecise statements found in AUPs
and the technical low-level mechanisms used to implement them. Real-world examples
show that PoLanCO is capable of implementing a wide range of policies found in cam-
pus networks. In addition, we also present the concept of Network Security Caps, an
enforcement layer that separates server/device functionality from policy enforcement.
A Network Security Cap intercepts packets coming from, and going to, servers and
ensures policy compliance before allowing network devices to process packets using
the traditional forwarding mechanisms. Lastly, we propose the on-demand security
exceptions model to cope with the dynamics of emerging research workflows that are
not suited for a one-size-fits-all security approach. In the proposed model, network
users and providers establish trust relationships that can be used to temporarily by-
pass the policy compliance checks applied to general-purpose traffic – typically by
network appliances that perform Deep Packet Inspection, thereby creating network
bottlenecks. We describe the components of a prototype exception system as well
as experiments showing that through short-lived exceptions researchers can realize
significant improvements for their special-purpose traffic.
KEYWORDS: Software-Defined Networking, Network Security, Policy Enforcement,
Security Exceptions
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Networks provide a wide variety of services needed by a diverse set of environments
that include (but are not limited to) enterprise and business operations (e.g. credit
card transactions, employee travel bookings, and payroll information access), aca-
demic and research workflows (e.g. big data transmission and analysis, virtual and
in-class online instruction), healthcare and medical procedures (e.g. patient data ac-
cess, medical procedures, virtual doctor visits), or housing affairs (e.g. residential
network connectivity, and rent payments). Moreover, networks, consisting of routers,
switches, Wireless Access Points (WAPs) and middleboxes (e.g. firewalls, load bal-
ancers), must interconnect a wide range of devices, including (but not limited to)
general-purpose machines like computer desktops and servers; hundreds of personal
and corporate mobile devices, for example, phones, laptops, tablets, or smartwatches;
appliances that provide monitoring and threat detection; and various kinds of spe-
cialized devices deployed at key places over the physical campus that include copiers
and printers, badge and biometric readers, intelligent thermostats, motion sensors,
IP telephones, surveillance cameras, video-conferencing equipment, or payment ter-
minals, to name a few.
All these devices generate varying types and amounts of network traffic that in
one way or another use a part of the underlying network infrastructure. For example,
security cameras may generate live streaming data (video/images) to a backup storage
system for easy retrieval of images from previous days, payment terminals might send
encrypted requests to external credit card franchise systems to check the validity of
debit/credit cards, Information Technology (IT) staff could configure printers to only
accept printing jobs from members of a particular department or a group of machines,
or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) may generate alerts to IT monitoring systems
1
that in turn might send control messages to a number of devices to mitigate malicious
or uncommon network activity.
The heterogeneity of campus networks has led organizations 1 to appoint spe-
cialized committees that define and establish directives and detailed guidelines re-
garding the desired and acceptable use of organization’s network. In particular, the
directives and guidelines are often referred to as rules because they describe how
devices should operate and communicate between each other (if at all) in terms of
who gets to send (or receive) what, when, where and how. A set of rules is usually
referred to as Network Policy that addresses a wide range of decisions that must be
made about the network. For example, network security policies might define the
standards for communications between any two systems in the campus network in
an attempt to minimize damaging actions like the theft of trade secrets, alteration
of data and services, or removal of intellectual property, among others. Even in the
absence of malicious actors and cyberattacks, policies are still needed to describe
acceptable use behaviors (also known as Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)) and inter-
actions within the network. Network policies also determine how communications
within the network should be distributed such that all network devices share the
network infrastructure fairly and optimally while aligning with the institution’s ob-
jectives. Moreover, policies are used to define permissions, prohibited behavior, and
the obligations of users and systems based on the organization’s hierarchy, personnel
expertise/roles, and the services provided.
Policies are of the utmost importance to organizations because they are tightly
associated to business objectives, internal processes and workflows, and federal obli-
gations. Unfortunately, technically precise documents describing such policies are
either non-existent or scarce at best. Often the only available policy documents were
written by Policy Writing Committees (PWCs) in the form of acceptable use and
1The terms organization, enterprise, and institution, will be used interchangeably throughout
the dissertation.
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Figure 1.1: A human configuring several devices to enforce multiple Acceptable Use
Policies (AUPs)
behavioral guidelines that contain a series of imprecise statements. The statements
use a high-level, non-technical language that focuses on organizational procedures
and workflows that can be easily understood by network users, board members, and
regulatory agencies and fall far short of providing technical information about the
actual enforcement of the policy. Hence, mapping vague non-technical statements
(understandable by humans) into low-level technical commands and configurations
(understandable by machines and network devices) in order to enforce policies is a
challenging task. The mapping process requires per-device intervention and heavily
relies on the AUP interpretation and expertise of the network operator (or server ad-
ministrator) in charge of configuring the network system (see Fig. 1.1). Furthermore,
the task is error-prone because it involves the management of heterogeneous policy
enforcement mechanisms that provide different (possibly conflicting) requirements of
the network infrastructure. For example, some mechanisms offer protection of the net-
work border against incoming connections, some allow separation of traffic between
groups of users, others authenticate individual users for privileged access to network
resources, and still others configure services with custom security. Generally, enforce-
3
ment mechanisms come with so-called “sane” defaults that do not always align with
the organizations’ objectives and policies. For example, when users/operators config-
ure, say, a new website or any other service (e.g. mail services, file servers, firewalls,
and IDSs), often a default configuration file is provided in case the user/operator just
wants the service/appliance to work out-of-the-box. Moreover, by relying on default
configuration files, policy enforcement and device/service configuration are conflated
in one place (the service/application), potentially leading to policy violations. Fur-
thermore, current enforcement mechanisms are rigid and meant to be in place for
large timescales. As a result, policy implementations are rarely dynamic and are
usually revised, at best, a couple of times per year. While the revision process may
have worked in the past, where all communications could be categorized as general-
purpose traffic, institutions now need more dynamic, agile, flexible, and intelligent
approaches that can cope with the growing number of complex specialized workflows
and activities that take place in a network.
This dissertation describes systems and tools that address the challenges de-
scribed above: First, it introduces a human-readable and technically precise language
that addresses the lack of a precise way to document, translate and verify how high-
level policies are mapped into their corresponding low-level implementations. Second,
it describes an alternative way to process packets in order to enforce network security
policies regardless of file misconfigurations or policy violations happening at end sys-
tems. Lastly, the dissertation proposes an approach towards network security policy
enforcement based on the notion of on-demand security exceptions. The exception
system allows individual, fine-grained, trusted research flows to temporarily bypass
the set of baseline security policies enforced for general-purpose (untrusted) traf-
fic. The results from the experiments show that with a prototype exception system,
complex research workflows are able to gain significant performance improvements
(more than an order of magnitude) when compared to the regular scrutiny applied
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to general-purpose traffic in the network.
1.1 Examples and Purpose of Network Policies
Network policies are sets of rules that determine how traffic and communications are
treated while they traverse any part of a network. Policies are expressed in a variety
of ways that range from high-level human-readable statements–comprehensible by
network users and network administrators–to low-level commands and configurations–
understandable and executed by network devices and end-systems that offer services
to network users. Policies have a profound impact in the interactions that take place
within a network because they arbitrate aspects such as network resources that may be
involved (e.g. web servers, databases, file systems) in a particular type of connection
(e.g. incoming, outgoing); when, how often and for how long communications are
allowed to happen (e.g. 30 minutes during business hours a maximum of 3 times
per week); which sets of users may be part of the communication (e.g. graduate
students of the biology department); who can initiate the communication (e.g. only
traffic originating from within the campus network); or what processing/conversion
should be applied to the communication (e.g. encrypted communication using secure
protocols).
Enforcing policy decisions in the network requires network-level mechanisms
that actually implement and carry-out the network policies. Although PWCs define
network policies using (high-level) non-technical statements, organizations (through
their IT staff) rely on enforcement mechanisms that are commonly deployed as part
of the network infrastructure (i.e. they are low-level). After all, communications
ultimately boil down to network packets and, in the majority of cases, the infor-
mation contained inside the packets suffices to apply policy. Since packets traverse
switches and routers, network operators have historically used the mechanisms em-
bedded in these network devices to enforce policy. Furthermore, network vendors
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have also developed dedicated network appliances that are optimized to enforce poli-
cies that require more complex functionality than the lightweight packet inspection
switches and routers do. The network appliances, also called middleboxes [1], rig-
orously scrutinize network traffic flows and apply actions like blocking or allowing
traffic, rate-limiting network connections that consume disproportionate amount of
bandwidth, or logging suspicious activity, ensuring that all analyzed traffic is policy
compliant.
Over the years, low-level enforcement mechanisms that are based on switches,
routers and specialized hardware have helped institutions deploy a wide range of
network policies. In the following, we list example network policies that use low-level
mechanisms to ensure policy compliance and are typically found in university campus
networks.
• All traffic coming into the campus must go through an Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS). IDSs are network appliances that inspect network traffic and gener-
ate warnings/alerts if suspicious or anomalous activity is detected. An IDS that
inspects all incoming traffic reduces the chances of compromising local network
assets from outside (untrusted) sources. In case of detection, an IDS helps net-
work administrators isolate compromised equipment in a timely manner and
apply appropriate controls to prevent similar events from occurring again.
• Web traffic should only reach registered primary (centrally-managed) and sec-
ondary (managed by units) web servers [2]. Web services are one of the principal
avenues for cyberattacks from external sources because they are “open-doors”
into the local network from the Internet. Network operators should implement
access control policies that prevent web traffic to reach unregistered servers
because oftentimes these servers are not properly maintained (e.g. running
insecure services, or lacking the latest security updates) and increase the the
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chances of security exploits in the network.
• In order for a vendor to gain access to a server from off campus, they must
be assigned a Virtual Private Network (VPN) account, and use the university’s
VPN service [3]. At times, university’s IT department cannot fully manage
specialized equipment in the network. For example, in High-Performance Com-
puting (HPC) environments, vendors might offer remote administration and
management services of the high-speed, low-latency, and complex Infiniband
network [4] due to a lack of trained staff in the university. VPNs establish
secure (and private) channels that protect university information traversing
shared/public networks (like the Internet) to reach authorized third-parties.
• Printing jobs in the computer science department may only be submitted by
members (faculty, staff, students) of the department. Network operators need
to limit access to network printers in order to preserve the estimated lifetime
of printers and the goods needed for the equipment to work properly (e.g.
cartridges, paper, memory, etc).
• Payroll systems should only be accessed by members of the human resources
department and designated payroll officials from units across campus. Payroll
systems contain sensitive information about employees like IDs, phone numbers,
addresses, or financial information (e.g. salaries, account numbers). Ensuring
that access to such information is only granted to an authorized group of indi-
viduals is vital to prevent harmful events such as identity theft and fraud.
• Traffic containing medical records traversing the campus must be encrypted.
Some network policies derive from rules found in federal regulations (HIPAA2 in
this case) that must be fully abided by in order to avoid penalties and sanctions.
2Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
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• No individual service or system running on the wired/wireless network should
send or receive more than 10 GB of data per day [5]. Network utilization
policies ensure that network infrastructure resources (e.g. links, servers, etc)
are fairly used among network users. Limiting the amount of traffic a user
may send/receive per day prevents network systems from being overloaded and
the services offered (e.g. web, mail, or file sharing applications) from being
disrupted.
1.2 How Network Policy Implementation is Done Today
In the same way that defining and revising network policies in an organization are
important practices to ensure that only legitimate operations occur in the network,
so are the mechanisms used to implement the policies.
When it comes to network security, one of the first objectives an organization
defines when setting up a network is to protect its local users and network assets (e.g.
services, databases, source code repositories, etc) from external malicious actors. Net-
work vendors have developed varying tiers (in terms of cost, features, performance) of
network firewalls that serve as the first line of defense against network attacks coming
from the Internet. Firewalls are strategically placed at the edge of the network with
the goal that outgoing (trusted) traffic is protected and all incoming (untrusted) traf-
fic is inspected. Firewalls make decisions on whether to allow or drop packets based
on a set of security rules that minimize the risk of cyberattacks from external sources.
Unfortunately, just guarding the borders of the network from external malicious ac-
tors is not enough to protect a network today. With the massive adoption of personal
(network-capable) devices, the chances for an entity within the organization to cause
a security violation drastically increase. For example, a personal laptop that has been
compromised before joining the enterprise network (e.g. by unknowingly download-
ing malicious software) may trigger unnoticeable attacks on local systems once it has
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been assigned a private campus IP address (e.g. via WiFi). In this case, the laptop
completely invalidates the protection offered by border firewalls. Deploying multiple
firewalls at various network locations could certainly decrease the chances of internal
attacks from succeeding. However, the approach is overly expensive, inefficient, and
non-scalable in the long term.
To complement the network edge protection offered by firewalls, network oper-
ators started to leverage built-in features and protocols found on traditional network
equipment as cheaper alternative approaches to enforce policies within the internal
network. One prominent example is the modified use of Virtual Local Area Net-
works (VLANs). VLANs were originally designed to group hosts in a network regard-
less of their physical location. Today, VLANs enforce security and privacy policies
(e.g. separating traffic between groups of users like professors and students), pro-
vide simplified access control between regions of a network (e.g. aggregating groups
of addresses into a unique VLAN number for a more concise notation), and enable
decentralized network management (e.g. delegating management of a VLAN to each
department’s IT staff) [6]. Despite being widely deployed in campus networks as
enforcement mechanisms, VLANs impose limitations in policy enforcement because
they were not designed with network security in mind. For example, the number of
possible VLANs one can configure per switch is limited (1-4096); potentially running
into scalability issues for organizations with large number of groups of users. More-
over, VLANs do not need to have the same meaning across multiple switches, e.g.,
VLAN 10 in one department may refer to student traffic while in another depart-
ment that same VLAN number may be associated with faculty traffic—the lack of a
unified source of truth with campus-wide information complicates policy enforcement
based on VLANs. As a result, most campuses have defined cross-campus standards
for VLAN numbers to ensure VLAN numbers have the same meaning and use every-
where on campus. Lastly, the VLAN information included in network packets can
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only be used as a lightweight form of identification (like IP or MAC addresses) but
do not provide any form of authentication that can prevent spoofing practices.
Firewalls and VLANs examine packet headers to enforce policy. However, as
noted above, additional mechanisms are needed to implement policies at the user
level. Even though IP and MAC addresses sufficed to identify a network user in the
past, today’s networks are far more complex and use advanced techniques (e.g. virtu-
alization) to share equipment across multiple users and applications. Consequently,
policies must be also applied to whoever is logged into a system and is generating (or
receiving) the network traffic; not to mention the complexity when multiple users are
logged in and performing distinct networking activities simultaneously. As a result,
network devices or appliances often include mechanisms that allow authentication
and facilitate dynamic mapping of users in the network to low-level identifiers like
IP addresses. One such mechanism is the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Ser-
vice (RADIUS) [7]. In RADIUS, the server acts as a central authentication place
for remote connection requests received at other network systems. In a simple de-
ployment, users provide authentication credentials to the network system they want
to access (i.e., the RADIUS client). Then, the RADIUS client hands over the user
credentials to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server internally searches the policy
that must be enforced on the user (e.g. grant full access, grant limited access, forbid
access) and responds back to the RADIUS client with the information found.
Lastly, network operators and system administrators modify the configuration
files of the services and applications running on network servers as well as end system
utilities provided by the Operating System (OS) in order to implement network poli-
cies for servers. Policies such as disabling unnecessary services from a system hosting
a database server, rejecting incoming requests from connections that use clear text
protocols, or only allowing access to a specialized end system from specific IP address
ranges, are example policies that oftentimes are implemented in configuration files.
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Configuration files are a convenient place to enforce policy because they are modular
(i.e. there is a configuration file per application running on the system), the language
and syntax used to modify values and enable (or disable) features is relatively easy to
understand (typically in the form of key-value pairs), and configuration files almost
never have to be written from scratch, instead, applications oftentimes come with
pre-populated (and well-documented) “sane” defaults that suffice to bring a service
up in the network and allow for easy modification.
1.3 Problems With Network Policies
Having described the need for network policies and given examples of policies used in
campus networks, we also need to mention some of the challenges of realizing policy
in today’s networks.
Lack of precise policy definitions and documentation: The first step in the
process of realizing network policies is to define them. Defining policies often
involves time-consuming and recurring (yet necessary) meetings and discussions
where PWCs of organizations revise objectives and procedures in order to estab-
lish what constitutes an acceptable use of the network by network users. Ideally,
the outcome of these discussions should result in a set of policy documents writ-
ten at three levels of abstraction. Namely, (1) at a high-level informing users
about how they should use the network infrastructure and services, (2) at a
middle-level human-readable yet technically-precise manner that tells IT per-
sonnel what the policy means in terms of network configuration (e.g. network
ranges, groups of systems, network traffic), and (3) at a low-level that can
be used by policy enforcement mechanisms that ultimately will implement the
policy.
Today, policy definitions exist at the higher level. Looking at several univer-
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sities’ network policies online [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], one can find statements and
documents indicating the permissible, mandatory, and prohibited actions that
users may and may not do if they use the campus network infrastructure. From
a technical point of view, high-level policies are vague and imprecise due to their
target audience (users, board members, regulatory agencies) and hide details
about the underlying equipment implementing the policies (i.e., the low-level
statements).
Unlike high-level policies, middle-level statements that should be targeted at IT
staff are non-existent or scarce at best. Even worse, instead of carefully deriving
the middle-level information from the high-level policies, network operators are
on their own (using their own intuition) when it comes to deciding how to map
vague high-level statements onto the network. The problem with this approach
is that the lack of technicality in high-level statements constrains the implemen-
tation of the policy to the interpretation and expertise of the network/server
administrator—policies become hard to accurately translate, deploy/implement
and verify. Even a perfect configuration where multiple policies are manually
added and sanity checked, the distributed nature of some policy enforcement
mechanisms (e.g. recall VLANs above) and the technical details found while
configuring network devices complicate tasks associated with network policy
maintenance. Mapping high-level statements straight into low-level configura-
tions hinders the possibility to verify and ensure that a policy is active over a
period of time. Moreover, because of the dynamic nature of campus networks,
nothing prevents other members of the IT staff to issue new configurations to
support an emerging service while unknowingly violating/overriding a policy
that was already in place.
Dangerous impact of server configuration in policy enforcement: Various
high-level statements found in university network policy documents (like AUPs)
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are expressed in terms of the services campus infrastructures offer and the
systems that host those services (e.g. web, mail, file, or video-conferencing
servers). For the most part, hardware and software powering services is highly
configurable, flexible, and capable of enforcing various types of policies via
simple modifications to configuration files. Albeit possible, there are adversities
of using server configuration as the only mechanism to implement policy. Policy
enforcement requires careful box-by-box configuration that does not scale well
(e.g. manual intervention for hundreds or thousands of systems in a campus
network), is error-prone (e.g. potential for typos in configuration files), and
conflates device/service configuration with policy enforcement. For example,
system administrators conflate functionality and policy enforcement when the
network policy requires a web server to be contacted over secure a connection
(e.g. via HTTPS and not HTTP), when administrators set up a blacklist to
certain nodes to forbid access from specific outside entities (e.g. pairing Secure
Shell (SSH) with fail2ban [13]), or when administrators limit access of a system
to a predefined set of networks, IP ranges, network users, or hosts in the local
network. In all three cases, the policy is implemented as part of configuration
files overlooking the fact that network equipment (i.e. routers/switches) could
enforce the desired behavior. In addition, it is challenging to enforce policy at
end systems because users, that now have the ability to join internal networks
with their personal equipment, might be system administrators themselves.
While a group of conscious users might responsibly follow security guidelines
published by the organization, the chances are high that most users oftentimes
end up relying on “sane” defaults that come with the applications they use.
Although default configuration files allow for fast deployments (i.e. services
working out-of-the-box), the default functionality found on the files depend on
decisions made, and best practices defined, by the developers of the software as
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opposed to organization AUPs.
The need for on-demand policy exceptions when the enforcement mecha-
nism negatively impacts legitimate workflows: Network policies are typ-
ically written and defined around the notion of general guidelines governing
all network traffic. However, in highly dynamic environments like campus net-
works, one-size-fits-all policies are restrictive and impose limitations to some
specialized workflows that actually align with the organization’s goals and ob-
jectives. In order to circumvent these limitations, a limited number of organiza-
tions have established a procedure to add exceptions to general-purpose policies.
Unfortunately, a network user in need of an exception has to perform a series of
time-consuming human-dependent steps such as filling out long forms justify-
ing the exception request, collecting signatures from high-ranked employees (e.g.
Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO)), scheduling
meetings with IT staff and PWCs, mailing hard copies of forms to multiple
offices, to name a few. In addition, the (static) policy exceptions a user can
requested are intended for static workflows that are expected to remain in place
for long periods of times (on the order of months). However, exceptions can
be given a more important role and can be used as a tool to provide context
that could allow user trusted workflows to temporarily bypass the general poli-
cies defined by network providers. Recall the first sample policy we presented in
Section 1.1: “all traffic coming into the campus must go through an IDS”. While
IDSs offer security features to network traffic, their internal packet processing
mechanisms and intensive analysis oftentimes result in adverse effects to com-
mon research-oriented operations. For example, science workflows often require
short-lived, high-throughput transmissions when working with large datasets
(e.g. to share data sets with collaborators at other institutions). Enforcing the
aforementioned security policy via heavy IDS inspection poses a major perfor-
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mance bottleneck to big data transfers and ignores the fact that network users
can share characteristics of the network traffic they will send before the transfer
starts.
With information about the transfers, individual workflows could be verified
and marked as trusted. After trust establishment, a valid exception for a data
transfer workflow would be to only allow the specific data transfer to bypass
the deep scrutiny of the IDS while the remaining general-purpose traffic would
still be subject to the general inspection policy, even if it comes from the same
end-host.
1.4 Dissertation Contributions
Part of the complexity involved in defining technically precise policies, conflating
server configuration and policy enforcement, and allowing trusted exceptions, lies in
the distributed nature of network equipment used to perform these tasks. It is hard
to describe and specify global network-wide policies when the entities and protocols
used to enforce them behave in distributed and independent ways. Even in reduced
environments (e.g. per-department policies), unawareness of the regulations that are
enforced elsewhere in the network could lead to unexpected violations to security
policies or undesired network performance for regular operations.
As noted above, the problems operators face with respect to network secu-
rity policies are: (1) Policy Writing Committees write network policy documents
using vague, non-technical, imprecise statements that are challenging to implement
in the network; (2) network operators configure network devices to implement poli-
cies largely relying on personal interpretation of the policy documents and personal
expertise and skill set; (3) policies that are targeted at servers are not enforced in the
network but usually implemented in configuration files of the server, thereby conflat-
ing policy enforcement with service functionality; and (4) traditional one-size-fits-all
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policies introduce performance and behavior issues to certain flows that do not need
enforcement.
In this dissertation, we will address these problems and provide the following
contributions.
Human-readable translatable policy language: We introduce a human-
readable yet technically precise policy definition language (called PoLanCO)
for network operators to write network security policies and request exceptions
based on information and details of the network gathered from multiple sources
and protocols (e.g. types of traffic, static files, RADIUS server authentications,
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) data, OpenFlow). The
network information includes specifics about the equipment that is used, the
built-in functionalities each network device has that can be used to enforce
policies, or the paths available to traverse the network. The proposed language
serves as a middle ground that fills the existing gap when translating vague
and imprecise high-level statements (typically tailored to network users) into
low-level configurations and commands of network equipment (used to enforce
policies). We show that with the human-readable language it is possible to
describe and document a set of policies describing the permitted, prohibited
and mandated behaviors users must abide by in several environments of a
campus network. Particularly, we show examples of how policy excerpts
publicly found on a large number of university websites can be written as
simplified human-readable statements using PoLanCO. Moreover, we also show
that operators may use PoLanCO to write policy statements that are not
found in AUPs that enforce policies regarding the interactions of components
within specific environments (e.g. printers in a department, the edge of the
network, emerging HPC systems, etc.).
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Separation of policy enforcement and server configuration: We propose a
network policy enforcement layer called Network Security Caps that leverages
OpenFlow packet processing to separate the enforcement of policies from
network server configurations. Unlike related work in the field, the approach
does not require a clean-slate network, ad-hoc modification of middleboxes to
enforce policy, or expensive network appliances to be deployed – significantly
reducing the Capital Expenditures (CapEx)/Operational Expenditures (OpEx)
when compared to a full overhaul of the network infrastructure. Moreover,
the enforcement layer can be extended to add customized services that require
decision making on a per-flow basis and are not necessarily tailored towards
only security. We reduce the potential danger to cause a security policy
violation by implementing policies not only at the end-system level but also
in the network equipment in charge of forwarding traffic. With this approach,
we do not abolish policy enforcement at end-systems, but rather ensure that
there are multiple layers of security controls placed throughout the network
system to minimize exploits. Under Network Security Caps , if a server is
misconfigured, the network will still ensure that actual policy is enforced to
the traffic sent to/from the vulnerable server.
Short-term on-demand security exceptions: We present a new approach to-
wards network security based on the notion of short-term on-demand security
exceptions. We developed an exception system where network providers and
network users can establish trust relationships in order to temporarily deploy
fine-grained policy exceptions that can be associated with individual workflows.
The exception system prototype requires users (or their applications) to authen-
ticate using university credentials and provide information about the character-
istics of their flows (e.g. target destinations, types of traffic, project numbers,
department affiliation). The flow information provides context to the decision
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making process of our automated system in order to deploy (or reject) an excep-
tion. Researchers are able to achieve performance improvements of more than
an order of magnitude for some of their research flows while letting general-
purpose traffic be regulated by traditional network appliances used to enforce
baseline security policies on the regular campus network.
Although the work in this dissertation applies to any type of Autonomous
System (AS), the focus of this work is on campus networks. We developed the
systems presented in this dissertation under the assumption that a campus network
is centrally controlled and managed by an IT group. With current advancements on
intent-based systems, campus networks have started to move to solutions that use
a centralized controller allowing us to apply (distributed) policy from a central IT
system.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents background and existing work related to the applications,
technologies and systems presented in this dissertation,
• Chapter 3 proposes a network policy language that is human-readable yet tech-
nically precise that translates network policies into low-level configurations,
• Chapter 4 describes the Network Security Caps enforcement layer that protects
end systems by enforcing policy in spite of misconfigurations,
• Chapter 5 describes our approach towards network security that uses trust
relationships to promote exceptions as first-class entities for policy enforcement,
• Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses future directions, further research opportunities,
and a summary of the work presented in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we describe the state-of-the-art of services and approaches that re-
late to the design, concepts, applications, and prototypes described in the subsequent
chapters of the thesis. First, we give an overview on how the traditional mechanisms
used to enforce security in computer networks. Then, we describe the challenges that
network operators face when trying to enforce security policies in networks. Next, we
review historical efforts that address those challenges that lead to the emergence of
the Software-Defined Networking architecture. Lastly, we summarize existing appli-
cations, frameworks and efforts addressing (part) of the problems we introduced in
Chapter 1. Specifically, we refer to approaches used to secure networks in Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) settings, and we report on network programming lan-
guages built for SDN that are intended for network operators to develop programs
– as opposed to Command-Line Interface (CLI) – that map high-level policies to
low-level configurations for policy enforcement.
2.1 Traditional Network Security
Networks consist of a set of distributed switches and routers where packets are for-
warded on a hop-by-hop basis. Network devices make independent forwarding deci-
sions based on network information gathered via several distributed protocols such
as the Link-Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [14] that advertises device identity
and capabilities to adjacent peers, the Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP) [15] that helps
preventing packets from looping in a single domain, the Routing Information Proto-
col (RIP) [16] that exchanges routing tables between neighbors, the Open Shortest
Path First (OSPF) [17] and Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS)
protocols that share the state of router interfaces to other routers, or the Border
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Gateway Protocol (BGP) [18] that exchanges paths and reachability among edge
routers of ASs.
Historically, network operators have manually configured networks by logging
into each node and issuing vendor-specific CLI utilities to configure the nodes in hopes
of a implementing a consistent policy across the network. More recently, because the
number of services, systems and devices in a network have increased exponentially
over the last decade, there has been a push from network vendors to offer centralized
controllers that network administrators can use to configure the network in a single
place. Examples of these controllers include SDN controllers (see Section 2.3.1),
Intent-based network controllers (e.g. Cisco Digital Network Architecture [19]), or
Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) Controllers (e.g. Aruba Controllers [20] ).
Albeit these centralized solutions provide network configuration consistency,
they do not solve the problems we highlighted in Chapter 1 and the demands to
protect the infrastructure from increasingly complex network attacks, provide optimal
performance for bandwidth/latency sensitive applications, and make efficient use of
the network resources. Moreover, the lightweight control and management features
embedded in general-purpose network equipment cannot efficiently enforce policies
that require heavy processing of network packets. Network vendors started to develop
dedicated intermediary appliances (so called middleboxes) that provide more complex
services and heavy processing than what is commodity routers/switches. Middleboxes
shortly became have become the go-to mechanisms where network operators specify
and enforce organizational policies based on sets of rules and event descriptions.
Moreover, some of the appliances also contribute to the security of the network.
With the increasing number of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) systems joining
networks, more avenues for security threats are opened. It is not uncommon to find
these specialized devices at various key locations in the network intercepting traffic,
replicating it for further offline monitoring, or performing any local action based on
20
the packet payload contents.
Network security has become a major priority in today’s networks given the
significant effects (including financial losses) a security breach – such as loss of con-
fidential or personal data, unavailability of a service, theft of intellectual property or
harm to network users – may cause to an organization.
In a distributed computer system such as a network, security involves the
protection of the resources that make up the infrastructure including the transmis-
sion medium (e.g. channels and connectors); network equipment like access points,
switches, or routers; end-systems such as servers, mobile devices, IP telephones, desk-
tops, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, etc. as well as the files and information stored
in them. Over the years, security experts from both industry and academia have
developed multiple security enforcement technologies and defense mechanisms in the
form of network appliances and dedicated systems to ensure that network infrastruc-
ture elements are secured from various attacks. Below, we describe some of the most
common security approaches found in traditional networks (also referred to as legacy
networks).
2.1.1 Firewalls
Firewalls are arguably the most well-established technology for protecting networks
from unauthorized access. They are typically the first line of defense to the outside
world (i.e. the Internet) inspecting all incoming and outgoing traffic to and from
the local private network (Fig. 2.1). The are several implementations of firewalls in
the market ranging from in both software (e.g. iptables [21], pfSense [22], PF [23],
Windows Firewall [24]) and hardware (e.g. Palo Alto [25], Dell SonicWALL [26],
Fortinet FortiGate [27]). Firewall solutions filter traffic and label it as legitimate or
malicious based on information found in network packets and a set of (prioritized)
rules that represent the policy of an organization. Firewall policies are typically
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Figure 2.1: Firewall as a perimeter defense of a network
• Deny-everything-not-specifically-allowed : Also known as whitelisting. Under
this setup all traffic is denied by default with the exception of a few allowable
connections. This model is highly conservative, severely limiting access to the
internal network from the outside.
• Allow-everything-not-specifically-denied : Also known as blacklisting. A more
permissive model that flags bad actors, placing them on a “forbidden” list and
letting all other communications go through.
In addition to the allow/deny policies, current firewall solutions also include
other services such as alert generation, system logging, network address translation,
connection tracking, and proxy functionality. Although firewalls are normally associ-
ated with perimeter defense, they can also be found at other locations in the internal
network. For example, in front of dedicated public servers, data centers, or even
running on critical end systems given that almost every OS provides an easy-to-use
firewall utility.
22
2.1.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) are software or hardware sys-
tems that monitor the events occurring in a computer system or network. IDPSs
analyze packet captures and events to identify signs of security problems [28] such as
suspicious activities (e.g. using BRO [29]) or by matching network packets against
well-known patterns and signatures (e.g. using SNORT [30] or Suricata [31]).
IDPSs can be described in terms of three main components:
• Information Sources: The information used to determine whether an intrusion
took place or not. For example, data collected while monitoring the network,
individual hosts, or application processes.
• Analysis: IDPSs dissect and organize the events obtained from the information
sources and determine when a particular sequence of events relate to ongoing
intrusions or compromises that already happened.
• Response: The actions that should be executed whenever an intrusion is de-
tected. The set of actions include passive measures such as logging, reporting
the incident to the network operator for further action, or some active opera-
tions such as dropping a connection, or redirecting it to a honeypot.
While IDPSs were historically present in the systems they protected (called
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems), network operators can achieve a significant
cost reduction by deploying these types of enforcement mechanisms as standalone
devices that can monitor targeted portions of the network (Network-based Intrusion
Detection Systems). Today, most of IDPSs are network-based that perform local
analysis of the traffic and report detected anomalies to a central management console.
IDPSs can be deployed at various locations (Fig. 2.2). For example, an IDPS
can be passively attached to a switch port that mirrors traffic coming from other
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interfaces for offline monitoring, actively deployed on the network path such that
packets are analyzed before they reach their destination, or activated on critical
systems that require enhanced security and are critical to the business operations



















Figure 2.2: Deployment of IDSs and IPSs
2.1.3 Virtual Private Networks
A Virtual Private Network provides a mechanism to protect data that is being trans-
mitted over the Internet (insecure) to a private network (assumed to be secure).
VPNs allow users to remotely (e.g. from home, say during a trip) access systems
and resources that are not accessible from the Internet because the campus firewall
(Section 2.1.1) normally blocks access to those resources from external locations.
In order to access resources via VPN, network users must install an authorized
client on their local machine to authenticate to a Remote Access Server (RAS) that
is normally located at the edge of the campus network. The RAS contacts a directory
service like a RADIUS or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server to
verify that the user is allowed to use the VPN service. The RAS then creates an
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encrypted tunnel over the Internet connecting the user to the campus edge so that
the user’s computer appears to be part of the campus network.
Once a network user is authenticated, every individual packet the user sends is
encapsulated in a new packet with new header information. The new packet provides
routing information so it can traverse the public network before reaching the tunnel
endpoint. Upon tunnel endpoint arrival, the packet is unwrapped and traverses the
internal network until it reaches the desired resource. Tunnels are established using
technologies such as the IP Security (IPSec) [32] protocol, the Point-to-Point Tunnel-
ing Protocol (PPTP) [33], the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [34] or the Secure









Figure 2.3: Using a VPN to access campus resources
2.1.4 Honeypots
A honeypot is a collection of servers or systems that is typically separated from the
production network and whose purpose is to lure attackers into interacting with them
(i.e. act as traps or baiting systems). The goal of a honeypot is to gather, log, and
analyze the operations and tasks executed by an attacker in order to learn her modus





















Figure 2.4: Multiple locations to deploy a honeypot
Honeypots do not enforce network security policies per se. However, they are
a frequently used security analysis tool that help network security policy writers with
the definition of newer controls for emerging attack trends. Since the Domain-Specific
Language we propose in Chapter 3 allows network operators to write statements that
send traffic to honeypots, we describe below the locations in the campus network
where honeypots are found.
Honeypots [35] can deployed at possibly strategic places throughout the cam-
pus network (Fig. 2.4). A honeypot deployed at the edge, outside the campus external
firewall, can attract a great number of external attackers since no pre-filtering is done.
However, honeypots at the edge do not monitor attacks coming from the inside of the
network. Another place where honeypots can be deployed is alongside Internet-facing
servers (e.g. web server, or file server) that are typically located in a Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ)—A “service” network located between the campus private network (se-
cure) and the Internet (insecure) where servers are carefully tuned and locked down
to receive access from the general public. Because of their exposure, a honeypot at
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this location could help network operators learn from potential insider and external
actors trying to access public facing servers. However, because DMZs typically sit
between two firewalls (i.e. an external firewall and an internal firewall), they only
receive traffic that either firewall let through and therefore do not see all possible ma-
licious connections. Lastly, honeypots can also be deployed inside the private network
to log and analyze behaviors and insider attacks. The major difficulty of a honeypot
is its initial setup as it still needs to be a controlled environment that has to resemble
a real network yet should not be used to attack production systems.
2.2 Limitations of Traditional Networks
In recent years, campus networks, enterprise networks, and data center networks
have grown in size, been used to carry a wide range of traffic, and become increasingly
complex, expensive and hard to manage [36]. Below we outline some of the challenges
network operators face when managing and trying to secure the growing number of
routers and switches that comprise today’s traditional networks:
Extensive Protocol Support: Router/Switch vendors often add support for a
wide range of protocols. While a large feature set may look appealing, it
complicates network management because some protocols can cause conflict
with each other or with features enabled other equipment thereby introducing
unexpected behaviors for network users.
Cross-Vendor Incompatibility: The incompatibility across multi-vendor equip-
ment leads to unusual workarounds to manage and troubleshoot the network.
The use of non-standard proprietary protocols makes it difficult for an opera-
tor to understand unexpected traffic behavior (e.g. packets being dropped, low
speeds over data transfers) reported by network users.
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Middlebox Processing: The extra layer of complexity added by middleboxes; al-
beit being pervasive and critical in medium and large networks, from a network
management point of view, they are significantly more expensive than general-
purpose equipment. These devices increase the CapEx/OpEx of organizations,
introduce a new set of vendor-dependent CLI commands and management dash-
boards that oftentimes require extensive training or outsourcing management,
add to existing box-by-box configuration workflow, and, like any proprietary
solution, packet processing is susceptible to bugs and misbehavior because un-
like general-purpose equipment, these middleboxes are typically blackboxes that
only the vendor can fix.
2.3 Software-Defined Networking
The problems outlined above are not new or even recent, dating back to the early-mid
1990s [37]. Since that time, the goal to enable programmable networks that simplify
network management and lower the barrier to deploy, new, more efficient, more se-
cure, services in the network has been an active research area. Caesar et al. proposed
a logically centralized Routing Control Platform (RCP) [38] that separated the IP
forwarding plane from the process of route selection and BGP route advertisement for
every router within an AS. Their work showed that RCP could emulate a full-mesh
Internal Border Gateway Protocol (IBGP) configuration while substantially reducing
the overhead on the routers. Greenberg et al. proposed 4D [39], a clean slate architec-
ture that generalized concepts introduced in RCP to achieve network-level objectives
(like efficient BGP route advertisement) instead of individual router configurations.
4D had four components, namely: (1) a Decision plane in charge of making all deci-
sions driving the network control based on a realtime view of the network topology;
(2) a Dissemination plane that provided a communication channel to install packet-
processing rules (derived from decisions made) into the network switches/routers; (3)
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a Discovery plane responsible of collecting topology and traffic information in the net-
work from neighbors and physical components; and (4) the Data plane whose main
function is to process individual packets based on state pushed by the decision plane.
While 4D was designed as a clean slate environment, the work of Casado et al. with
the Ethane [40] architecture demonstrated a concrete deployment of programmable
network infrastructure on Stanford’s University campus network. The deployment
proved that previous efforts to separate the decision making process from packet
forwarding would indeed not only simplify network management, but cause a re-
duction of expenses due to the use of commodity hardware. Moreover, Ethane had
the potential to develop innovative workflows in the network based on fine-grained
policies, enable network virtualization, and serve as the basis to raise abstractions
of network concepts/elements that could yield the development of network program-
ming languages. SDN could be considered one of the most effective demonstrations
towards enabling programmability in traditional IP networks [37], particularly with
examples of publicly successful deployments like Google’s data center network [41],
the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) [42] a federated virtual
testbed for research experiments, AT&T’s take on how to integrate SDN with tradi-
tional technologies to enable an SDN Internet Service Provider (ISP) backbone [43],
or Facebook’s SDN solution to efficiently deliver content to its users [44].
In addition, higher-level abstractions for networks such as network program-
ming languages (Section 2.4), network operating systems, security applications, new
paradigms like Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and cloud computing show
the rapid evolution of SDN over the last decade. Both industry and academia have
been involved in a myriad of projects tackling on-going deployment and research prob-
lems under this architecture (e.g. self-driving networks [45, 46], Internet eXchange
Points [47, 48], security attack mitigation [49, 50], portability of applications [51, 52],
policy and intent mapping [53, 54], etc.). SDN is still an emerging architecture and
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due to the well-known rigidness of IP (and its narrow waist) and the cost associated
in the replacement of existing infrastructure, SDN has the potential to replace the
distributed architecture on which the Internet was built. Nevertheless, we consider
SDN can coexist with legacy technologies and more importantly, gives the research
community an opportunity to explore alternative approaches towards problems in
legacy networks.
2.3.1 Architecture
SDN separates the control plane from the data plane into a logically centralized entity
(Fig. 2.5). By decoupling the data and control planes, network devices become simple
forwarding elements that carry out the decisions made by the centralized entity (called
the Network Operating System (NOS) or SDN controller).
The NOS uses a well-defined interface called the Southbound Interface to mod-
ify the forwarding state of network devices and determine what actions should be
applied to specific network flows via control messages. Internal modules in the NOS
generate the messages that make network decisions based on information such as net-
work load, status of the network topology, network policies, or requests from network
applications built on top of the NOS.
The ability to develop network applications (shown in the management plane
of Fig. 2.5) is what makes SDN networks programmable. The NOS abstracts the com-
plexities found in the forwarding plane (e.g. diversity of vendors, supported protocols)
and defines Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) (the Northbound Interface)
that network applications can use to provide specialized services (e.g. traffic engineer-
ing, Quality-of-Service (QoS), security, and routing) similar to the features offered by
traditional routers.
In SDN, every plane has its own specific functions, can evolve independently,














Figure 2.5: SDN architecture
tion of concerns has fostered network innovation from both academia and industry.
Some vendors have developed highly-capable SDN-compliant forwarding equipment,
several open source communities promote and develop NOSs projects, and a variety
of research projects constantly tackle complex problems that were hard to address
under traditional networking (e.g. network orchestration, global policy management,
holistic network troubleshooting). The systems we describe throughout this disser-
tation are mainly network applications in the management plane of the SDN archi-
tecture. Our prototypes used the Aruba VAN [55] as control plane and hardware
OpenFlow-enabled switches deployed at various locations of the campus network of
the University of Kentucky as the data plane of our SDN network.
2.3.2 SDN Northbound and Southbound APIs
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are the means that allow a layer in SDN
to exchange information with, and access features provided by, another layer. While
specific implementations of SDN might have several APIs within an individual layer
(e.g. built-in modules or internal processes communicating with each other), there are
31
two major APIs in the overall SDN architecture, namely, the Southbound Interface
and the Northbound Interface.
Southbound Interface: The Southbound Interface is used for communication be-
tween the controller and the forwarding devices. In OpenFlow, the NOS acts
as a server whereas the switches behave as clients. Note that this role is only
relevant for the establishment of the communication channel (i.e. the three-way
handshake). In reality, OpenFlow messages can be sent in either direction in
an asynchronous fashion as long as the control channel is active. Some example
control messages include OpenFlow version negotiation (bidirectional), request
for packet counters (controller-initiated), or network event reporting (switch-
initiated). Over the years, several NOSs have added support for both newer
and legacy protocols in addition to OpenFlow. For example, OVSDB [56] can
be used to configure virtual Open vSwitch (OVS) nodes, NETCONF [57] and
SNMP [58] enable compatibility with non-OpenFlow devices, and OpFlex [59]
provides policy control for Cisco-only deployments. In this thesis, we focus our
implementations around the OpenFlow protocol. Specifically, we use the NOS
to modify the Flow Table(s) of OpenFlow-capable devices and determine how
traffic flows are processed based on the contents of the packet headers (e.g.
source IP, destination IP, incoming port, protocol). Section 2.3.3 discusses in
more detail the ways of processing network packets using OpenFlow. We leave
implementations of SDN using legacy devices as future work (although some of
our initial efforts are included in [60]).
Northbound Interface: Unlike the Southbound Interface, the Northbound Inter-
face does not have well-defined protocols binding the NOS with network ap-
plications. Instead, the Northbound Interface uses technologies from the soft-
ware world such as REST APIs [61], gRPC [62] or Software Development Kits
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(SDKs)1 to allow network applications consume information and features offered
by the NOS. While there have been some efforts to standardize the Northbound
Interface [63], currently, NOS developers define the technology, API calls, and
data models that management applications must use to fetch/push network
information data. As a result, vendor lock-in scenarios at the control plane
are not uncommon when developing network applications. We addressed this
problem in [52] by adding a lightweight translation layer on top of the con-
trol plane. The translation layer (described also in Section 3.4.3) serves as a
unified Northbound Interface for all the systems we describe in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 5.
2.3.3 SDN Packet Processing: Reactive vs Proactive
In an OpenFlow-enabled SDN network traffic is processed primarily based on two
components (1) the information present in the header of each packet and (2) the set
of active flow table entries (also called OpenFlow rules) in a switch at the moment of
packet arrival.
When a packet arrives at a switch, the switch’s processing pipeline determines
the modifications and actions that must be applied to a packet. In the initial experi-
mental versions and version 1.0 of the OpenFlow protocol, the pipeline was composed
by one individual flow table (the minimum number of tables for a switch to be Open-
Flow compliant). Newer versions of the protocol (optionally) allow for more complex
processing letting the packet be modified multiple times throughout the processing
of linked flow tables.
Packets are matched against existing OpenFlow rules in the current processing
table. Should a match occur, the actions found in the matching rule are executed.
The actions may explicitly direct the packet to another table for further processing,
1A collection of libraries used for developing applications for a specific device or operating system.
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Table 2.1: An example flow table with four OpenFlow rules










50 400 pkts controller 0 0xae
ethertype=arp 1 10 pkts go to table 200 0 0xff
* 0 3000 pkts drop 0 0xff
modify some of the packet headers before exiting the pipeline, send the packet out
of a particular port, or simply drop the packet. The OpenFlow specification [64],
provides in great detail the list of (mandatory and optional) actions and instructions
that can be applied to packets.
A flow table consists of multiple prioritized rules. The structure of each rule
is shown in Table 2.1. The match specifies the field values a packet header must
have for the rule to be activated (e.g. the third rule matches Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) traffic The priority establishes the order in which rules are evaluated
in the table (higher priority rules are evaluated first). The rule counters contain
statistical information about the number of packets (and bytes) that have matched
the rule. The rule actions determine the operations or pipeline processing applied to
a matching packet. Possible actions include (but are not limited to) rewriting packet
header fields in the (rule 1), sending traffic to the controller (rule 2), forwarding
packet to another table in the pipeline (rule 3), or simply dropping a packet (rule 4).
Each rule has two timeouts that define the lifetime of a rule. A hard timeout specifies
a fixed lifetime for the rule. An idle timeout determines for how long a rule may last
without a packet match. For example, in Table 2.1 rule 1 expires after two minutes
with no matching packets and the rest of the rules do not expire unless explicitly
instructed by the controller. Lastly, each rule has a cookie set by the controller when
the rule was installed. The (internal modules of) NOSs use cookies to simplify rule
management. For example, in Table 2.1 the cookie value 0xff could be associated
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to default rules pushed by the controller upon switch connection whereas any rule
starting with 0xa could represent a rule pushed as a consequence of a Northbound
Interface request.
A rule that has all of its fields wildcarded is called a table-miss rule and
determines the default packet processing for traffic that did not match any other
rules. A table-miss rule is similar to the default route in a routing table in legacy
networks where in the absence of a prefix match, a default route is selected to forward
a packet to. In an SDN network, where SDN controller defines the decision logic of
the network, it is important to determine what and when rules will be installed in the
switch based on the packets that traverse the network. There are two basic default
modes of packet processing, namely, reactive and proactive processing. We describe
both modes below using the examples shown in Fig. 2.6.
Reactive: Under reactive processing (Fig. 2.6a), once a switch (e.g., R1) receives
the first packet of a flow (step 0), the table-miss rule instructs the switch to
send the packet to the controller. Then, at the controller, internal network
applications get access to the contents of the packet and issue control messages
based on the packet information (step 1). In the example shown in Fig. 2.6a,
the network application installs two flow entries at R1 and R2 (step 2) that
ensure subsequent packets of that same flow reach HOST B without contact-
ing the controller again (step 3). The main benefit of the reactive processing
mode is its flexibility to make decisions via internal controller applications for
every unknown packet. For example, the on-demand security exception sys-
tem (Chapter 5) inspects Domain Name System (DNS) responses to deploy
exceptions “on-the-fly” for data transfers to cloud storage providers that adopt
moving target defense practices. However, the major drawback of reactive pro-
cessing is that in the presence of multiple flows the controller can get severely
overloaded. A buggy network application could fail at handling bursts of re-
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quests introducing unexpected behavior to the network users.
Proactive: In proactive processing, in order to prevent NOS overload, the default
table-miss drops all packets unless there is a rule matching the traffic. In
the example shown in Fig. 2.6b when a flow from HOST A is initiated, it
is possible for the packets to get dropped (step 0) because of the table-miss
action. Under proactive processing, network users need to wait until a controller
module (possibly after an external request from a management plane network
application) installs some flow entries at the switches (step 1 and 2). Upon
rule installation, packets may traverse the network and reach their destination.
The proactive processing mode is a conservative approach that is generally
adopted when it is possible to know before-hand the flow characteristics and the
actions that should be applied to the packets of such flow, and when controller
overload is a concern. The systems presented in this dissertation that leverage
a controller NBI assume flows (involving types of traffic, end points) are, for the
most part, known in advance; therefore, proactive is the main mode of packet
processing of the proposed systems. The main drawback of proactive processing
is that on-the-fly dynamic packet processing is not possible because controller
applications never make decisions (i.e., issue control messages) based on packet
contents.
2.3.4 Leveraging SDN to Enhance Network Security
Under the SDN architecture, network application developers (e.g., researchers, ven-
dors, technology companies) leverage the NOS’s global view of the network and event
reaction to develop a variety of network security solutions ranging from use-case-
specific protection applications (e.g. the DNS protector app from HP [65]) to more
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Figure 2.6: Types of packet processing in SDN-enabled networks
plane Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), or unconventional application coding to provide
security to a network.
In terms of network security policy enforcement, there are systems and frame-
works that leverage OpenFlow to follow the same definition of a policy (a set of rules)
that we used in the systems described in the following chapters.
Ben-Itzhak et al. [66] proposes the EnforSDN architecture based on the ob-
servation that middleboxes (e.g. Firewall, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), IDS,
etc.) are consist of three logical processing layers: (1) Configuration plane derived
from a high-level policy description, (2) a resolution plane that uses concrete policy
rules derived from the configuration, and (3) the Enforcement plane that corresponds
to the low-level data plane instructions applied to a traffic flow. In EnforSDN , the
resolution and enforcement planes of middleboxes are separated to reduce middlebox
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overload, network load, and latency. Fig. 2.7 shows the architecture and control plane
flow of EnforSDN in a simple network with a firewall and two switches. Policies are
fed into the middlebox as configurations. Then, once the source device initiates a
flow, the first packet is sent to the network appliance for policy resolution, i.e., how
to handle subsequent packets of that flow. Once a middlebox decides how to process
packets in the flow, the decision is informed to the SDN controller (via a custom API)
for enforcement using OpenFlow rules such that further packets of the same flow do
not go through the appliance again. Unlike EnforSDN , our work derives policies from
AUPs that are fed into the working memory of a separate decision system (Business
Rule Management System (BRMS)) that generates the OpenFlow rules that must
be installed in the network. We argue that middlebox modifications is expensive and
infeasible in campus networks. Instead, we leave middlebox enforcement “as is”for
general-purpose traffic and propose an exception system that can deploy middlebox-
free paths on a per-flow basis for trusted users that share information about their


















Figure 2.7: Architecture and control plane flow in EnforSDN
Bakker et al. [67] propose an OpenFlow-based network-wide virtual firewall
that extends the functionality of traditional (perimeter) firewalls by allowing traffic
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filtering not only at the boundaries but within an OpenFlow-network. Fig. 2.8 shows


















Figure 2.8: Network-wide Firewall example deployment and rule installation workflow
Before any policy enforcement takes place, policy domains should be defined.
In the example, there are four policy domains, namely, campus-wide, wireless, Virtual
Machines (VMs), and wired. After switches have been assigned a policy domain, the
network operator may start defining policies using the rule syntax shown below.
Then, the network-wide firewall application checks the rule syntax, the existence of
the policy domain, and the absence of potential policy conflicts with already deployed
rules. After validation, the system schedules the deployment of the policy. Policies
are defined as singleton rules (Access Control List (ACL) rules) that use the following
OpenFlow-like syntax:
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Rule r = {src_ip, dst_ip, protocol, src_port, dst_port,
policy_domain, action, time_start, time_duration}↪→
The policy domain field enforces policies across a group of switches whereas
the time start provide basic policy scheduling functionality. PoLanCO (described in
Chapter 3) does not have scheduling capabilities, however, Drools, the decision system
used to generate rules, does. We leave adding scheduling functionality to PoLanCO
as future work (Chapter 6). On the other hand, not only PoLanCO enforces policies
on a group of switches but also PoLanCO can enforce policies that are expressed
in terms of the varying types of end systems and middleboxes in the network (e.g.,
web servers, laboratory machines, firewalls, IDSs). Lastly, our work allows for the
deployment of on-demand security exceptions as well as more complex policy actions
than the basic filtering (i.e., allow and block) actions supported by the network-wide
firewall application.
In Policy Graph Abstraction (PGA) [53] network operators from various units
in a campus network specify policies simultaneously using network graphs. The input
graphs are consolidated in one unified graph that holds the allowable communications
between systems in the network. Policy graphs may include middlebox processing
requirements as well. middleboxes are modeled using pyretic [68] programs that de-
scribe a middlebox’s behavior. Rezvani et al. [69] extended PGA to let network
operators specify priorities in policy graphs as well as blocking policies since PGA is
mostly a whitelisting model. The added PGA extensions address problems found in
current OpenFlow rule compilers where redundancy anomalies are common thereby
reducing the number of actual rules being pushed to the network switches. We ar-
gue that both systems could be incorporated as part of the rule generation phase in
PoLanCO’s translation pipeline. PGA treats the network as “one big switch” making
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it challenging to deploy on-demand exceptions that allow specific flows traverse the
network over an alternative (local) path. Although we share PGA’s goal to auto-
mate the way network operators translate high-level policies into low-level network
configuration commands, PGA and our work address the problem from two perspec-
tives. PGA resembles diagrams network operators draw when designing policies, our
work focuses on the definition of human-readable and technically-precise statements
derived from AUPs that use imprecise language.
FlowTags [70] proposes an extension to middleboxes to support tags and a
dedicated API that helps middleboxes interact with the NOS. FlowTags enforces
network-wide policies by controlling the route of a packet in the network using the
Type of Service (ToS)/Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field of the IP
packet header. We argue that modifying middleboxes is challenging because of the
quantity and diversity of middlebox solutions available today. Moreover, reusing the
ToS/DSCP IP packet header field could yield to unexpected behaviors of network
traffic based on existing Differentiated Services (DiffServ) deployments in the network
(e.g. voice, media streaming).
Qazi et al. propose SIMPLE [71], a network security approach the enforces
policies by steering traffic through a desired sequence of middleboxes. Similar to our
approach, SIMPLE assumes there is a network management mechanism that pro-
vides the controller with information about middleboxes (e.g., location, load, and
capabilities). Policies in SIMPLE can only be expressed in terms of middlebox chain-
ing (e.g. HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic must go through a firewall,
then an IDS, and then a web proxy). Unlike the work presented in this dissertation,
SIMPLE does not provide a human-readable policy language and does not allow for
the enforcement of policies in the network that are usually embedded in the con-
figuration files of end systems. Although the exception paths we implemented in
Section 5.4.2 could be replicated in SIMPLE (i.e. specifying a policy that does not
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go through any middlebox), SIMPLE policies are specified by network operators for
long timescales whereas in our exception system we deploy exceptions dynamically
(on-demand) based on established trust relationships between groups of users and
network operators.
OpenSec [72] is an OpenFlow-based framework where network operators can
specify security policies in a human-readable language. Although OpenSec’s language
is more readable than what could normally be written using network programming
languages (Section 2.4), we argue that PoLanCO provides better human-readability
because OpenSec’s language (1) still uses low-level identifiers (e.g., VLAN numbers,
interface numbers, port numbers), (2) does not resemble human-readable sentences
found in AUPs, and (3) only focus on the packet processing done by middleboxes and
does not consider policies that are embedded in configuration files of end systems.
Moreover, OpenSec assumes a topology where middleboxes are removed from the path
between the LAN and the Internet which is not always possible in campus networks.
Similar to FlowTags, OpenSec requires modification of middleboxes, specifically, an
agent that can report the results of the analysis to the NOS. If an agent can be added
to middleboxes, PoLanCO could be easily extended to support the same capabilities
of OpenSec’s language with better human-readability and relaxing the assumption of
middlebox placement.
CloudWatcher [73] is a security monitoring framework for the cloud. Similar to
OpenSec and SIMPLE, the operator describes the security services (i.e., middlebox
functionality) that must be applied to a particular traffic flow specified via an 4-
tuple. CloudWatcher focuses on optimal routes to send traffic to Middleboxes in
a cloud environment with multiple alternative paths. In contrast, in our exception
system (Chapter 5) our goal is to compute paths that actually bypass middleboxes
using the Neo4j graph database.
Shin et al. propose FRESCO [74], an OpenFlow programming framework that
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allows network operators to design, implement, and compose security detection and
mitigation modules using a simplified scripting language for the NOX [75] controller.
Albeit different in syntax, the scripting language could be placed at the same level of
abstraction as the Drools code we described in Section 3.3. We used a mapping func-
tion to translate PoLanCO statements into valid Drools code to generate OpenFlow
rules that enforce policy. We could change the mapping function to generate valid
FRESCO modules. However, policy enforcement in FRESCO requires the analysis
of network traffic at the NOS level; therefore, the NOS could easily be overloaded
and become bottleneck of the network. Instead, PoLanCO follows a proactive packet
processing where policies are enforced at the data plane via OpenFlow rules with
minimal intervention of the NOS.
The systems we describe below address specific network security scenarios that
are complimentary to the work we describe in this dissertation. We reference them
for completeness. Mehdi et al. [76] shows how four traffic anomaly detection algo-
rithms (Threshold Random Walk with Credit Based Rate Limiting [77], Virus Throt-
tling [78], Maximum Entropy Detector [79], and NETAD [80]) can be implemented
in SDN using OpenFlow-enabled switches and the NOX controller processing only a
small fraction of the packets in any individual connection. OrchSec [81] proposes an
architecture to develop security applications in SDN networks that can be spawned
across multiple (possibly different) NOSs. The authors discuss increasing iterations
of the architecture as well as a detailed example on how to develop an application
that addresses problems of DNS amplification attacks (a type of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack). SDN-Guard [82] proposes a scheme to protect SDN networks
against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by rerouting, adjusting timeouts of rules, and
aggregating rules of malicious flows. SDN-Guard relays switch-to-controller packets
to an external IDS that informs the threat probability of each flow. FleXam [83]
addresses the problem that IDSs have to inspect massive loads of traffic to perform
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security analysis. The authors propose a sampling extension for OpenFlow in the
form of an additional “sample” action. The extension allows the controller to poll a
reduced number of packets (based on stochastic or deterministic sampling) and access
only specific parts of the packet contents (e.g., only headers, only payload). Neu et al.
present a lightweight IPS [84] that utilizes switch counters to prevent port scanning
attacks. Network Security Caps can benefit from the approach to not only enforce
policies that are embedded in configuration files but also protecting end systems from
port scanning attacks.
HoneyMix [85] and HoneyProxy [86] are SDN-based systems that aim at de-
feating honeypot well-known detection techniques [87, 88]. Zhao et al. [89] propose
a fingerprint hopping method that uses moving target defense to interact with a net-
work attacker in a honeynet. PoLanCO statements could be written to direct infected
hosts to any of these systems. Lastly, Community Connect (CoCo) [90] allows the
creation of on-demand VPN services via an easy-to-use web portal without requiring
network operators to manually configure network devices. We believe that our ex-
ception system could leverage the dynamic nature of CoCo to offer the deployment
of on-demand VPN services.
2.4 Network Programming Languages
We described in the previous section various frameworks and systems addressing
policy enforcement practices in an SDN network. In the majority of the cases, the
network applications were developed using general-purpose imperative programming
languages (e.g., java, python, C++) to interact with the services, APIs and abstrac-
tions provided by several NOSs (e.g. Floodlight, ONOS, OpenDaylight, etc.). This
section presents existing work in a new class of languages called network programming
languages (NPLs). NPLs are a type of Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs) developed
to write network applications where the network operator specifies what must hap-
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pen to arriving network packets rather than how it is done. As a result, network
programming languages are mainly written on top of declarative programming lan-
guages (with the exception of Pyretic [68]) although some NPLs follow a functional
reactive programming approach for event-driven applications where network events
(e.g. resource discovery, link congestion) trigger policies that are expressed in terms
of allow-or-deny actions applied to underlying switches. NPLs are surely a higher-
level abstraction than traditional per-device configurations. However, we suggest
that NPLs are not suitable for policy definition because they impose a steep learning
curve on network operators who historically have not been application developers but
rather network application users. We list NPLs below for completeness and acknowl-
edge that most of them could be used as the mechanism that generates configurations
(OpenFlow rules) of the policy language we present in this dissertation. NPLs have
considerably evolved since the inception of OpenFlow and the adoption of NOX [75]
as the default control plane back in 2008. FML [91] was NOX’s de-facto policy lan-
guage that triggered policy conflicts due to distributed authorship within a single
policy domain. Nettle [92] brought in the manipulation of series of messages rather
than individual message processing. Procera [93] let developers express policies based
on external events (e.g. QoS, intrusion detection). Frenetic [94] and Flog [95] propose
a three-stage approach for NOSs policy enforcement: (1) query network state, (2) ex-
press policies, and (3) reconfigure network. Both NPLs hide low-level details relative
to rules and network events. Regular expressions were introduced in FatTire [96] to
describe network paths (e.g. “*” represent all traversing paths). The authors of Net-
Plumber [97] introduced Flowexp, a language that also relies on regular expressions
and whose goal is to check constraints on the history of flows. Pyretic [68] intro-
duced the parallel and sequential composition operators in python programs to allow
for collaborative application development. Netcore [98], based on Frenetic, provides
an enhanced compiler that divides programs into two pieces, one that runs on the
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switches and another that runs on the controller. Flowlog [99] resembles SQL and
presents an interface that treats the control- and data-planes as one individual plane.
Merlin [100] and Kinetic [101] are more advanced frameworks that provision net-
work resources (e.g., bandwidth) and provide abstractions that automate changes in
network policy. NeMo [102] is one of the first attempts for expressing human intent-
based policies to create virtual networks via commands that are sent along REST
calls. Lastly, MPI [103] proposes a service-oriented policy language characterizing
policies as services established between two end nodes (e.g. hosts, subnets) through
a traffic specification pattern (e.g. HTTP, SSH) that traverse any number of net-
work functions (e.g. load balancers, byte counters, firewalls). This policy language is
heavily based on PGA [53].
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Chapter 3. PoLanCO: A Policy Language for Campus Operations
Network policy definition is a key component in network deployment and adminis-
tration. Defining policies ensures that operations in universities are legitimate and
secured, follow standards and specifications, abide by federal regulations, align with
business objectives and procedures, and ensure adequate provisioning of services.
Committees or groups of business experts consisting of high-ranked senior employees,
referred to as Policy Writing Committees (PWCs) in this dissertation, are usually
the authors of network policies. However, the points of view of PWCs typically fo-
cus more on the global requirements and procedures of the organization rather than
the low-level configuration details needed to adapt network devices to support the
network policies. The documents that PWCs create are oftentimes called Acceptable
Use Policies (AUPs). AUPs use generic terms and vague wording (business jargon)
and are commonly the only reference point and source of truth for network opera-
tors to configure network devices to enforce policy. Consequently, network operators,
based on their expertise and interpretation, have to carefully read the AUPs to un-
derstand the purpose of the policy, extract relationships and conflicts among the
AUPs, and derive the technical details and enforcement mechanisms required to de-
ploy the policies. For example, network operators issue CLI instructions on network
devices (e.g. switches, routers, middleboxes, etc.), and server administrators modify
application-specific configuration files to enforce AUPs.
Clearly, there is a substantial gap between the definition of a policy and its
enforcement that makes the policy translation process manual and error-prone for
network operators and system administrators. Nevertheless, with current advance-
ments in network architectures and existing practices based on business rules and
procedures, it is possible to develop software-based intermediate mechanisms that
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can automate the translation from of imprecise AUPs into valid and correct network
configurations.
In this chapter, we introduce a Policy Language for Campus Operations
(PoLanCO) based on (1) current technologies used in businesses for policy definition
via Business Rule Management Systems and (2) the Network Security Caps policy
enforcement layer presented in Chapter 4. Network administrators and system
administrators can use PoLanCO to precisely define a large number of policies with
a simple human-readable syntax. PoLanCO provides a high-level abstraction that
hides the low-level details and syntax of device CLI instructions and configuration
files, and automates the deployment of policies on the network infrastructure based
on the fine-grained flows diverse applications generate. We present examples on
how to write PoLanCO statements that represent the AUPs that PWCs write and
show how the simplified PoLanCO statements enforce network policies in various
environments and locations of the campus network.
3.1 Motivation
In Chapter 1 we highlighted the importance of defining network policies in campus
network infrastructures. Network deployments are becoming larger and more com-
plex, requiring not only constant physical infrastructure renovations and hardware
refresh cycles (i.e., device installations, cabling) but also revised rules and policies
regarding how all these new devices should interact with each other and with any
existing system/service in the network.
Normally, the outcome of an organization’s PWC is a set of non-technical
policy document(s) (AUPs) that use business-like language to inform network users
about the current regulations governing IT infrastructure-related activities. Unfor-
tunately, the statements found in policy documents are predominantly imprecise and
make it hard for network operators to understand or know how to encode the pol-
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icy into the network equipment. Moreover, the current policy translation process
does not provide feedback to the PWCs in charge of writing the AUPs, in particular,
feedback from the network operators in charge of deploying the policies. PWCs do
not necessarily understand the low-level mechanisms used to enforce policies (e.g.
commands, configuration files, protocols) and thus do not understand the challenges
(and sometimes impossibility) of implementing the policies they write. Network oper-
ators, though issuing syntactically valid commands and configurations, could partially
and/or incorrectly enforce high-level policy due to misinterpretation of the written
policy statements.
Take for example the short excerpt from the Internet-facing web server secu-
rity guidelines found on the Carnegie Mellon University’s website [104] and shown
in Fig. 3.1. While PWCs are likely able to understand (most of) the contents of
the high-level policy document excerpt, there is hardly a direct association between
guidelines expressed in the AUP with the low-level details (i.e. variable definitions,
port numbers, syntax) found in the configuration files of web servers. As new, more
complex, technologies continue to be developed, associating policy documents with
enforcement mechanisms becomes harder. For example, not long ago Apache [105]
was the de facto solution for hosting a web site. However, newer solutions such as
Flask [106] or Nginx [107] are commonplace today due, in part, to their “easy-to-use”
setup nature and other capabilities they offer (e.g. efficient load-balancing, proxy
services). Fig. 3.2 shows a snippet of an Nginx web server configuration file imple-
menting the policy. After comparing the policy with the server configuration file,
we can see that there is no direct mapping between the high-level statements (the
policy definition) and the configuration details (the policy implementation). In fact,
they could be in conflict. Take for example the guideline shown in line 1 of Fig. 3.1:
“Configure web server to meet recommended vendor best practices”, system and net-
work administrators responsible for setting up the server could interpret the portion
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“recommended vendor best practices” as configuring the web service software with the
default settings. However, the default settings normally open port 80 (i.e. HTTP)
in both IPv4 and IPv6 (see lines 2-3 in Fig. 3.2) in the server. Enabling port 80
may be undesirable as it allows the transmission of web traffic in clear text, possibly
exposing authentication credentials or other sensitive information. Moving forward
in the policy document, line 3 requires that the server enables necessary web services
and disables all others. Though the configuration file does allow an administrator to
specify the port on which the web service will listen to incoming connections, dis-
abling other unnecessary services is typically performed via OS utilities and not the
web service configuration file.
1 4. Configure Web server to meet recommended vendor best practices
2 - Install the Web server software on a dedicated host
3 - Enable necessary web services; Disable all others.
Figure 3.1: CMU web server policy excerpt
nginx.conf
1 server {
2 listen 80 default_server;
3 listen [::]:80 default_server;
4 server_name example.com www.example.com;
5 root /var/www/example.com;
6 index index.html;
7 try_files $uri /index.html;
8 }
Figure 3.2: Example web server (Nginx) configuration excerpt
Moreover, it is hard for network operators to recall what policies caused the
current state of a configuration file. It would be beneficial if network operators
could use technically-precise documentation to not only track changes in configuration
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files but also as a way to obtain feedback from the PWC–that is, do these precise
statements match what the PWC intended in the original policy? Answering the
question is even more challenging if we take into account that configurations could
have been written in the past (months or years ago) by other network operator (with
varying expertise and skills) and perhaps under different policies.
Besides the lack of feedback between PWCs and network operators, the trans-
lation of high-level policies into low-level configurations today is for the most part
manual. Even under the assumption that network operators are able to accurately
abstract out technical details and commands from AUPs, configurations need to be
individually pushed to the set of network devices enforcing the network policies. Al-
beit possible—after all, this is how policies have been implemented thus far—this
approach to policy enforcement is error-prone, time consuming and difficult to verify.
In fact, others [108, 109] have reported that human errors occurring during device
configuration are the main cause for network outages and unexpected behaviors in
networks.
As shown in Section 2.3, challenges associated with human/manual config-
uration in network management has been one of the main motivations behind the
development of emerging network architectures that try to simplify and centralize
configuration/management [40, 38, 109]. The ability of an SDN controller to push
out configuration (in the form of rules) to routers/switches has the potential to re-
duce the intervention of operators during the implementation of AUPs. Further, the
integration of SDN with automated systems that implement business policies present
an opportunity to adapt solutions from the business world to network configuration
challenges, bringing PWCs and IT staff together in AUP enforcement tasks.
We introduce a “middle-ground” mechanism in the form of a DSL (called
PoLanCO) to tackle the challenges network administrators face translating policy
into configuration. Specifically, network operators are now able to convert high-level
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guidelines and directives into a series of short, human-readable and technically precise
(PoLanCO) statements. The produced list of statements could be used to validate if
the abstracted “middle-level” policy (i.e. PoLanCO statements) is indeed what the
PWC expressed in the high-level policy documents. In other words, feedback becomes
a key component of the translation process because it allows network operators to
revise and change the derived (PoLanCO) statements to appropriately represent the
policies defined by the PWC. In addition, since the derived short technical statements
follow a structured human-readable syntax, software that uses emerging technologies
in networks and business operations can be developed to ensure that the statements
are automatically translated into low-level enforcement mechanisms. Thus, reducing
the intervention of operators in the deployment of the policies.
In the following section, we describe the design goals of PoLanCO. We cover
aspects such as the need to know the characteristics and roles of network systems,
the goal of remaining vendor and protocol neutral, the emphasis on avoiding the
use of network-level identifiers to express policies, and the opportunities to improve
workflows that depend on the dynamics of the network (e.g. changing the role of a
network node, or deploying an exception to global network policies).
3.2 Design Goals
As noted earlier, technically-precise, human-readable language would be useful as a
way to provide feedback between PWCs and network operators, and to automate the
translation process from policies into low-level configurations. We describe below the
set of features and characteristics that such a language should have:
Avoiding Low-Level Network Identifiers: Low-level network identifiers are, un-
surprisingly, commonplace when operators reason and analyze how to translate
policy documents into configuration files or device CLI instructions. Low-level
network identifiers are the type of information that network devices and end
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systems expect as input in order to process network traffic. However, thinking
about policy at such a low level of technical detail is unnatural for humans that
better reason in terms of words, characteristics, roles, and the like. Take for ex-
ample the way we connect to websites. We use human-readable domain names
(e.g. www.google.com, www.uky.edu, www.wikipedia.org) as opposed to their
corresponding IP addresses (even network operators prefer not to use them!).
Instead of using network identifiers, we can assign each identifier a role and/or
trait (e.g. group of users, device types, type of traffic) and raise the level of
abstraction of technical configurations. Human-readable statements based on
such assignments can (1) be easily understood by PWCs, (2) help move to-
wards the documentation of policies that were previously deployed, and (3) be
expanded by translation mechanisms into low-level details when needed.
Network Description: The proposed language will need to have terms to describe
common networking concepts like file servers, web servers, printers, firewalls,
secure channels, blocking, mirroring, etc. and the translation mechanisms used
to install low-level configurations will know what portions of the network con-
figurations should be pushed to, and how the configurations should look.
Event-Aware: While some of the policies that need to be enforced on networks do
not change over long periods of time, some policies are dynamic, periodic, or
based on the current status of the system. The language should allow the spec-
ification of the type of actions that must be triggered whenever a relevant event
happens, thus providing context to the policy. Events may include situations
like the addition of new equipment to the network, detection of a malicious
actor or an infected machine, changes in the policy, current time of day, etc.
Extensible and Vendor-Agnostic: The language should be generic enough to
hide proprietary, vendor-specific characteristics of the network as well as the
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complexities of the low-level mechanisms present in the network. Resolving
what features or protocols to use in order to enforce the policy should not be
part of the language used to define the policies but a part of the system that
translates language statements into low-level instructions. As we described in
earlier chapters, networks have continuously evolved in complexity over the
years. Whether it is the type of systems that are part of the infrastructure, or
the features supported by existing equipment, we require the language to be
easily expandable and allow for new types of policies to be specified.
Exceptions: The language should allow for the explicit specification of authorized
exceptions. As we will describe in Chapter 5, exceptions are a common part of a
policy ecosystem and the current process to deploy them is largely manual. IT
departments often require that users in need of an exception submit a request
(say via e-mail or a web form) to obtain permission and install an exception.
Typically, a PWC analyze exception requests every few weeks or months. Once
the risks and implications of the request are evaluated, the deployment of the
exception finally takes place (or the request is rejected). While we agree that
pre-authorization is important for the deployment of exceptions, the current
process is manual and heavily dependent on human intervention (see Chapter 5).
We want to make PoLanCO the middle layer where both policies and their
exceptions can be written and automatically deployed. The language will help
keep the documentation consistent over time, while handling dynamic workflows
that require timely-deployed short-lived exceptions.
3.3 Approach: Leveraging Business Rule-Based Management Systems
Defining and enforcing policy based on a series of facts, events, and characteristics
is not unique to networking. For example, businesses define policies in terms of the
products and services offered, the interactions with existing and prospective cus-
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tomers, and the federal and state legislation businesses must abide by. With a goal of
automating processes that were otherwise manual or error-prone (e.g. profiling cus-
tomers), business management and IT departments joined efforts to develop decision
systems, called BRMSs, that make choices based on a given set of facts and events.
At a high-level, BRMSs consist of four main components, namely, a rule repos-
itory, a set of tools for rule authoring and maintenance, data objects that represent
the current facts in the system, and a runtime environment that invokes the rules.
Fig. 3.3 shows how the components of a BRMS interact with each other. The rule
repository is the centralized place (similar to a database) where all rules are stored.
A business rule can be defined as a statement that aims to influence or guide behav-
ior in an organization [110]. A rule is the place where the decision logic (i.e. what
to do) is separated from the core production application code (e.g. how to do it).
Business rules are created, modified and removed using rule authoring tools. Author-
ing tools help business experts and IT staff in the definition, design, documentation,
and modification of business rules. BRMS vendors and/or third-parties develop these
tools that vary from simple markup syntax to sophisticated web-based applications.
Business rules are defined based on the current facts (also called working memory) of
the system. Facts may be added to the runtime environment both at startup or as a
consequence of other rules being activated. The runtime environment, also called rule
engine, implements a continuous execution cycle based on the rules and the current
status of facts when each rule is being evaluated. The output of the rule evaluation
include the addition (or modification/removal) of facts—possibly triggering another
set of rules—and the execution of external procedures, for example, production code
















Figure 3.3: High-level architecture of a BRMS
3.3.1 From Business Rules to Network Policies
BRMSs normally come with syntax restrictions to write business rules that are heav-
ily influenced by the underlying programming language used to develop the actual
BRMS. Currently, there is no unified or standardized language to specify rules seam-
lessly across BRMSs solutions. However, the structure of the rules is, for the most
part, the same. In addition to programming language preambles (e.g. environment
variable definition, library and data structure importing), business rules have two
main constructs, namely, a conditional (antecedent) and a body (consequent) [111].
The conditional, typically represented by the keyword when, is used to express the
set of constraints that must be satisfied in order to activate a rule. Constraints are
written in terms of the properties of the data objects that are part of the work-
ing memory of the BRMS. The body, typically represented by the keyword then,
contains the set of actions that are executed if the constrains are satisfied. Unlike
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constraints, actions may include API calls to either local processes or external services
(e.g. logging systems, monitoring frameworks, network equipment), or modifications
to working memory data objects. Some example rules that use the Drools [112]
syntax are shown in Fig. 3.4. The first rule (i.e. welcome.rule) shows an example
banking organization’s policy for customers whose loan was approved (line 3). The
body of the rule (lines 5-6) includes the actions that must be executed whenever a
loan is approved. Note that in welcome.rule, the actions do not modify the status
of the working memory but rather execute external processes (logging and mailing).
However, the action in line 7 of the second rule (i.e. auto-approve.rule) does cause
a modification to the working memory. The rule changes the status of a loan appli-
cation when the amount requested is less than 5,000 dollars and the credit score of
the applicant is greater than 675 (lines 3-4), thereby causing the welcome rule to be
triggered whenever a loan is auto-approved.
Business rules are lists of statements that determine whether some action
should happen (or be avoided) based on well-defined constraints. As presented ear-
lier, the rules are often expressed in BRMSs using a specific syntax that is typically
provided by the BRMS vendor. BRMSs are flexible mechanisms that could be lever-
aged to enforce policies in networks in the same way that it enforces business policies
and automates processes. The flexibility of a BRMS comes from the fact that any
data object can be part of the working memory. Based on the examples provided
above, a banking institution would include relevant information like customer data
(e.g. age, credit score, active products, etc), or product information (e.g. type of
loan, amount requested), as facts in the BRMS’s working memory. Moreover, facts
associated with events (e.g. applying for a product such as a credit card or a loan)
can also be registered in order to expand the type of policies that can be written as
a result of an event. Network policy management adheres to the same model. Some
of the facts needed to enforce network policies can be found in information about
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welcome.rule
1 rule "welcome message"
2 when
3 $app: LoanApplication( status == status.APPROVED);
4 then





1 rule "auto-approve loan"
2 when
3 $a: LoanApplication(amountRequested <= 5000)
4 $c: Customer( id == $a.custID, creditScore >= 675)
5 then
6 LOGGER.debug("Auto-approving loan for $ to customer ",
$a.amountRequested, $a.ID);↪→
7 modify ( $a ) setStatus ( status.APPROVED )
8 end
Figure 3.4: Example business rules written in a BRMS (Drools)
the nodes and connections of the underlying topology. For example, consider the
policy commonly found at various university websites (shown in Fig. 3.5) [113] that
requires network operators and system administrators to disable insecure protocols
from network devices and systems in the network. A BRMS can automate the im-
plementation of the policy. Fig. 3.6 shows an example Drools code that enforces the
policy. Assuming nodes are part of the BRMS working memory, the conditional of
the rule (line 3) selects all the nodes where the policy will be enforced (i.e. nodes
that are of type NETDEVICE). Then, the body of the rule includes configuration details
need to enforce the policy. For example, line 5 specifies protocols numbers of insecure
protocols such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), telnet, and HTTP; in line 6 Config
objects are created using information about each selected node in the conditional,
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the protocols, and the action representing the policy decision; and line 7 launches an
internal function that uses the created Config objects to push actual configurations
(e.g. OpenFlow rules) into the selected network nodes.
Applications which transmit sensitive information over the net-
work in clear text, such as telnet and ftp, are prohibited and
will be blocked




3 $n: Node( type == type.NETDEVICE);
4 then
5 protocols = new ArrayList<Integer>(Arrays.asList(21,23,80));
6 cfg = new Config($n, protocols, PolicyAction.BLOCK);
7 ConfigPusher.push(cfg);
8 end
Figure 3.6: Example Drools code that generates configurations for network devices
in working memory
As described in subsequent sections, BRMS code has the potential to enforce
a large number of policies provided the working memory contains specific details and
characteristics about the network such as the role a node has in the network (e.g.
firewall, L3 router, L2 switch, printer, etc.), the enforcement mechanisms every node
supports (e.g. different OpenFlow versions, remote CLI commands, NETCONF), the
type of node (e.g. network device, end system), the status (e.g. infected, quarantined,
up, down), and the way nodes are connected with each other (e.g. link capacities,
VLAN information).
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3.4 Implementing a Domain-Specific Language
BRMSs provide tools (typically out-of-the-box) for writing business rules that hide the
complexities and verbosity found in traditional programming languages. Nonetheless,
even though the rule-definition syntax is greatly simpler than regular programming
language code, it contains several elements (e.g. symbols, keywords, identifiers, an-
notations) that are not typically found in human sentences; therefore, readable state-
ments are difficult to construct using BRMS-specific code. For example, the body
part of a Drools rule is particularly hard to read because it often contains (multiple
lines of) java code to launch other application processes (e.g. line 6 in Fig. 3.4 or
lines 5-7 in Fig. 3.6).
By contrast, PoLanCO was intentionally designed to severely restrict the token
namespace that operators may use to write human-readable policies. Yet, PoLanCO is
translatable to machine code. Fig. 3.7 shows a concrete example of a top-down trans-
lation pipeline (i.e. set of steps) that starts with the AUP written by a PWC [114]
and ends with the generated Drools code that pushes network configurations onto the
network. Unlike the contents of policy documents written by PWCs (e.g. the security
policy at the top of the pipeline), network operators write PoLanCO statements that
are human-readable, technically precise and derived from the contents of an AUP.
The statements allow network operators to have an unambiguous interpretation of the
policy that is being enforced without getting involved in the complexities of complex
Drools (and java) code.
Once a network operator writes a PoLanCO statement s, s is divided into
groups of words w0, ..., wn where each wi is passed as parameter to a translation
function T (w) that generates valid Drools code. Table 3.1) shows five w inputs and
their corresponding Drools code. While the first two groups of words (i.e. policy
and policy priority) are simple word replacements, the rest of the groups of words
generate more verbose Drools code that is hidden from an operator’s perspective.
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The resulting Drools code for the firewall policy example is shown at the
bottom of the pipeline. The generated code not only interacts with the working
memory of the BRMS (i.e. identifying firewall nodes) but also launches back-end
methods that build OpenFlow rules (i.e. ConfigGenerator), resolves types of traffic
and end points (i.e. aliasEvaluator), and issues REST requests to the NOS to push
the configurations (i.e. ConfigPusher).
Table 3.1: Translation function T (w)
PoLanCO Grammar w Drools Code T (w)
policy rule
policy priority salience
[Nn]ode is a {type}
$n: NetDevice(









Translating PoLanCO statements into executable Drools code is only a portion
of the complete workflow that starts with PWCs writing AUP documents and ends
with low-level device configurations enforcing the policies. Assuming an operator has
read and interpreted the contents of AUPs, Fig. 3.8 shows the steps that happen
when a policy is actually enforced in the network using PoLanCO (the translation
process is skipped as it was already described). First, the team of network operators
must agree on a descriptive meaning for every low-level identifier needed to enforce
a policy. For example, associating (1) IP ranges such as 10.10.0.0/20 to a group
of devices like mobile devices connected in the university library, (2) individual IP
addresses (123.456.1.3) to university authorized servers such as DNS or Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) servers, or (3) port numbers (80, 443, 9100)
with types of traffic such as web or print jobs. The association between identifiers
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Network Security / Firewall Policy
1. Purpose
Access to information available through the universitys network systems must be strictly controlled in accordance
with approved network access control criteria, which are to be maintained and updated regularly.
...
2. Definitions
Firewall: A firewall is an information technology (IT) security device which is configured to permit or deny data
connections set and configured by the organization’s security policy
3. Policy
...




Node is a FIREWALL
then
Block traffic from Internet to campus networky




$n: NetDevice($labels: labels contains "FIREWALL")
then








Figure 3.7: Translation pipeline from a high-level network policy into Drools code
and high-level descriptions needs to be first fed into the system before any PoLanCO
statement is written. A mechanism to specify identifier-description associations is
described in Section 3.4.1. Additionally, in order for the policies to be implemented in
the network, the translation system (that translates PoLanCO to SDN configurations)
must discover the network topology and role of each node in the network graph. The
62
underlying SDN network is assumed to be capable of discovering the campus network
topology and learning the role of each node in the topology. Once the topology
is discovered, it becomes part of Drools’ working memory; at this point, network
operators can start writing multiple policies using PoLanCO.
All the PoLanCO statements are evaluated and mapped into Drools code
following the procedure explained above. The back-end components (written in Java)
launched by the generated Drools code contact the SDN Northbound Interface via
standard REST API requests. The SDN controller processes these requests by sending
FLOW MOD OpenFlow messages that instruct the switch (or switches) to add entries
to the flow table; thereby, enforcing the policy (Chapter 4 describes the enforcement
layer in more detail).
3.4.1 Network Information Gathering
One of the reasons why it is difficult to express campus network policies in terms
of low-level identifiers is that often it is not straightforward to map those technical
details into high-level entities. Even though operators might be familiar with low-
level networking addresses, protocols, services, etc. using such jargon as a means
of feedback with PWCs hampers the opportunity to establish a two-way dialogue
between both parts.
In order to improve the expressiveness and precision of a policy, every low-level
network identifier must have a high-level meaning associated to it. The association is
what enables the construction of precise human-readable network policy statements.
For example, MAC and IP addresses can identify individual users, subnets could iden-
tify groups of users, VLANs and port numbers could represent types of traffic. Note
that these associations are already being made when operating a campus network.
However, hardly ever the meaning of low-level identifiers is used in AUPs.
In order to incorporate the mappings into PoLanCO, we require the topology
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1. Network Information Gathering
Associating Descriptions
with Low-Level Identifiers







- Roles of Nodes in Network
2. PoLanCO Statements













when ... then ...
when ... then ...
when ... then ...
Figure 3.8: Workflow to enforce policies using PoLanCO
discovery to be performed before any policy is defined. Gathering the network infor-
mation can certainly be done in multiple ways. For example, Cisco DNA [19] relies
on their Identity Services Engine to map network user IDs to various end systems
(a similar approach can be achieved using alternative implementations of RADIUS
servers). For simplicity, in our prototype we perform information gathering on two
fronts. Namely, an alias file and the discovery capabilities of SDN controllers. Net-
work operators must define the associations in a static file that we refer to as alias
file. The file is formatted in YAML [115]. Fig. 3.9 shows an excerpt from an example
alias file.





3 - ip: 10.0.0.0/8
4 - ip: 172.16.0.0/12
























29 - protocol: tcp
30 - number: 80
31 - port:
32 - protocol: tcp
33 - number: 443
Figure 3.9: Excerpt from an example alias file
extensible (in accordance with the language design goals). The alias file can be
either modified manually or generated as output of a more sophisticated service (like
RADIUS). Each item of the alias file is separated by three dashes (e.g. lines 6, 10,
15, etc.). Currently, there are two main components per item, namely, an alias (or
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a traffic type) which is the actual word that is to be used in PoLanCO statements,
and a list of specifications (specs) that contain information regarding the low-level
identifiers associated with a given alias. The code generated by the transformation
function T (w) maps the aliases back to the corresponding low-level identifiers. YAML
allows reusing objects that were already defined in the file (avoiding duplication) by
using anchors, where & is the anchor symbol. For example, the alias “storage systems”
(line 21) comprises the ceph storage address (line 11-14) and a subnet of Amazon Web
Services S3 buckets (line 16-19). In that way, it is possible to define an individual
policy statement for transfers to different types of storage systems (as we will show
in the evaluation of our exception system in Chapter 5) even though one system is
located in the campus network whereas the other is a public cloud service.
The second piece of information used during the policy translation is the dis-
covered topology. While a group of network operators could potentially draw a sketch
on how nodes are deployed over the network, the approach would not only take a long
time but also does not take into account dynamic events that occur in a network (e.g.
a server reboot, a switch disconnect, a damaged link, or a new mobile device con-
necting to the wireless network). NOSs provide built-in topology discovery features
that create an initial topology sketch comprised of OpenFlow-enabled devices, the
connections between them, and the connections to attached devices discovered when
the NOS inspect ARP or DHCP packets coming from the end systems.
Unfortunately, NOSs discovery features only distinguish between two types of
nodes, OpenFlow switches and end systems when, as described in Chapter 1, networks
are composed of many heterogeneous systems (e.g. firewalls, printers, badge readers,
virtual machines, mobile devices, storage nodes, IDSs, credit card terminals, etc.).
The alias file described above could be used to add properties to the discovered
nodes. For example, hosts discovered in the IP address range 123.100.22.0/27 can
be marked as “netlab” machines. In addition, operators may use traditional network
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management protocols (e.g. SNMP) to extract information from network devices
(both OpenFlow and non-OpenFlow) and add it as properties to specific nodes in the
discovered topology. Optionally, operators may also specify middlebox information if
the NOS discovers the interface(s) of the middlebox as independent end systems in
the initial topology sketch.
Fig. 3.10 presents an example topology stored in a graph database, specifically
a (Neo4j [116]) database. The NOS discovered the portion of the network enclosed in
red. Then, say, an automated system added a “FIREWALL” label to the top node.
Additionally, on the right-hand side of the figure, a portion of the non-OpenFlow net-
work (surrounded in blue) was discovered using traditional protocols such as SNMP
and LLDP, and labeled nodes for further use by the BRMS.
Figure 3.10: Augmenting topology information using OpenFlow and traditional pro-
tocols
3.4.2 Writing Policy Statements
Once the network information gathering is completed, network operators can write





3 [policy priority n]
4
5 [when
6 Node is [connected to] a device-type
7 then ]
8 Action [param] [traffic-type] traffic [from end point A] [to
end point B]↪→
Figure 3.11: Syntax of the Policy Language for Campus Operations
Table 3.2: List of values for each PoLanCO token
TOKEN TOKEN Values
device-type Firewall, Web Server, Switch, Printer, etc.
Action (param)
Allow, Allow-Only, Block,
Send to (Controller, IDS, HoneyPot), Mirror to (Port)
traffic-type Web, FTP, Video, Print Jobs, etc.
end-point netlab-network, storage-systems, authorized DNS, etc.
A policy always starts with the keyword policy followed by an operator-
defined name assigned to it. Policies can be assigned a priority that influences the
order of the policy processing by the BRMS rule engine; higher priority policies are
evaluated first. PoLanCO statements are written following the syntax shown in lines
5-8. The structure resembles the way business rules are defined using the keywords
when and then. In Fig. 3.11 there are four tokens that can be replaced with multiple
values (see Table 3.2).
The values of the device-type correspond to the labels added to the nodes in
the graph database during network information gathering. At present, PoLanCO
supports actions that include allowing (i.e. forwarding) legitimate traffic, blocking
(i.e. dropping) packets of a particular flow, sending packets of the matching flow to
an external entity (specified as a parameter) for further processing, and mirroring
(i.e. copying packets) to a particular port (if applicable) for out-of-band analysis.
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As we can see, gathering network information is vital for the definition of PoLanCO
statements. In terms of the syntax of the statements themselves, policies should be
written following the conditional-body structure of conventional business rules. For
policies that have to be applied in all the devices in the network, the conditional of
the PoLanCO statement can be omitted.
Last but not least, the power of the PoLanCO syntax is that with simple
combinations of words that describe the types of nodes or their relationships it is
possible to identify the appropriate set of devices where network policies can be
applied. We present some examples in Section 3.5.
3.4.3 Translation Layer
One of the design goals defined in Section 3.2 is to make PoLanCO agnostic to low-
level mechanisms used to enforce the policies. SDN controllers can send messages
using protocols like OpenFlow (and NETCONF) that facilitate the distribution of
rules and device configurations to equipment built by various vendors. However,
PoLanCO, as a network application, is tightly bound to the vendor-specific North-
bound Interface APIs and is hampered by the lack of a standard NBI among SDN
controllers.
Even though implementations of the NBI are intended to offer a common
programming abstraction to network applications, the interfaces vary widely across
NOSs (proprietary and open source); existing implementations include ad-hoc and
RESTful APIs, multilevel programming interfaces, file systems, or more specialized
APIs [109]. The NOS-specific designs for the NBI make it difficult for network appli-
cations (like PoLanCO) to evolve independently. Typically, applications end up tied
to a specific NOS even if the application is not using any NOS-specific concepts or
features, just common abstractions such as a flow, a port, the topology, etc. In reality,
what makes the application portability process hard is the fact that API methods
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and data structures vary, as opposed to the underlying conceptual abstraction.
Consequently, with state-of-the-art NOS solutions it is not possible to perform
policy translation in two NOSs software (given the same topology and same set of
high-level policies) without having to re-write the BRMS application code that pushes
configurations, learn new data models, APIs, and NOS-specific conventions.
To passively circumvent the network application portability problem, and in-
stead, allow PoLanCO to enforce policies in networks that are either controlled by
multiple controllers or change controller software regularly, we developed a REST
API TranslaTOR (RAPTOR) for OpenFlow controllers [52]. RAPTOR serves as a
single common NBI that is located amid the NOS and the BRMS components capable
of pushing switch-specific and SDN-protocol specific configurations into the network.
RAPTOR unifies the network information found in controller-specific data
models of multiple NOSs and puts them into one common generic data model that
can be used to make PoLanCO (or any other application) portable.
BRMS Process


























Figure 3.12: RAPTOR layer to provide language portability
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Fig. 3.12 shows where RAPTOR is placed along the NBI of existing controllers
to provide portability for PoLanCO (to any underlying SDN controller). RAPTOR is
lightweight in the sense that it is stateless and does not prevent network applications
from using NOS APIs directly. RAPTOR creates object instances on-demand every
time a call is made to a controller, and returns the responses back in JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) format to the BRMS process. Unlike the REST API of
some controllers, RAPTOR APIs follow the guidelines prescribed in the literature [61,
117] and perform various types of translations including Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs), HTTP verbs, and data models.
Fig. 3.12 also shows the internal building blocks of RAPTOR. First, RAP-
TOR defines a set of common abstractions that includes switches, ports, flow entries,
actions, flow match, etc. The data models representing the abstractions are com-
mon across all components of RAPTOR and the backend service of the BRMS that
generates the low-level configurations. Second, RAPTOR also defines a list of APIs
(Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)) that high-level applications (e.g. the BRMS
component that pushes configurations) access via REST calls in spite of the NOSs
controlling network devices. Lastly, each controller supported by RAPTOR is in-
cluded as a “plugin” composed of two elements, namely, a dictionary (in YAML [115]
format) of equivalences between RAPTOR and the controller’s conventions (i.e. field
names and values), and a file where abstract methods ought to be implemented in
order to adhere to the translation layer.
3.5 Examples
This section presents examples of how high-level imprecise policies found on several
academic institutions can be translated into simplified, human-readable statements
using PoLanCO. All the examples described below would need an associated alias file
that defines the port numbers of certain types of traffic (e.g. DHCP, DNS, FTP, or
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HTTP traffic) as well as IP addresses of known end systems (e.g. printers, DHCP
servers). However, to keep the examples short, the alias file is generally not shown.
In most cases, the file is rather straightforward to define (see Fig. 3.9 for an example
alias file).
The following examples show various types of campus network security poli-
cies. When possible, excerpts of the high-level (vague) policy found on the university
websites are displayed along with the PoLanCO statements written to represent the
high-level policies.
3.5.1 Disabling Insecure Protocols
Recall the example presented in Section 3.3 that introduced a clear-text prohibition
policy commonly found in university websites:
1 Applications which transmit sensitive information over the
2 network in clear text, such as telnet and ftp, are prohibited
3 and will be blocked
The relevant information needed to write PoLanCO statements appears in
lines 2 and 3 where types of traffic in the form of protocols (i.e. telnet, FTP) and the
corresponding action (i.e. prohibit, block) are specified. The PoLanCO statements
derived from the contents of the policy and the alias file generated to write the
statements are shown in Fig. 3.13.
The conditional part of the two PoLanCO statements is omitted because all
network devices on the campus network need to enforce the policy. Fig. 3.14 shows an
example topology where the policy is enforced at various places, namely, a firewall, a
router, and two switches. The definitions in the alias file cause the BRMS to generate
OpenFlow rules that drop incoming packets from any interface whose destination is
the either of the FTP control or data ports (20 and 21) and the telnet port (23).
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PoLanCO Statements
1 Block ftp traffic





4 - protocol: tcp
5 - number: 21
6 - port:
7 - protocol: tcp





13 - protocol: tcp
14 - number: 23
15 ---
















Figure 3.14: Enforcing a campus-wide policy that disables insecure protocols
The network configurations shown are in the form of OpenFlow version 1.3
rules. However, during the network information gathering phase, where every topol-
ogy node is added as an object to the working memory of the BRMS, each type
of device can be assigned a mechanism for policy enforcement (e.g. any version of
OpenFlow, NETCONF/Yang, iptables, remote SSH commands, etc).
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3.5.2 Securing Network Printers
Most printers come with a default configuration that allows users to start using them
out-of-the-box once the printer is plugged in to the network. Though out-of-the-box
functionality is appropriate for a home network, carelessly plugging printers in to
an enterprise network poses various risks because multiple unnecessary services are
enabled, an easy-to-guess administrative password is set by default, and printers can
be accessed from outside the network if they get a public IP assigned by mistake. If
compromised, a network printer could be used to steal data (e.g. contents of print
jobs), attack other systems in the network (e.g. DoS) or print an excessive amount
of spam messages causing waste in resources.
Some universities have published policies on how to secure network printers.
Fig. 3.15 shows a printer policy found on the University of California–Berkeley’s
website [118].
1 To secure your printers from unauthorized access, print
2 configuration alterations, eavesdropping, and device compromise
3 follow these printer security best practices:
4
5 - Campus printers should not be exposed to the public Internet.
6 - Use encrypted connections when accessing the printers
administrative control panel.↪→
7 - Do not run unnecessary services.
Figure 3.15: Printer policy of the University of California–Berkeley
The statements in the policy are not technically precise. In fact, the state-
ments are guidelines and not mandatory policies. However, in order to protect net-
work printers and avoid the security risks entailed due to misconfiguration, network
operators can write PoLanCO statements that enforce the practices outlined in the
guidelines.
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For example, the guideline in line 5 could be addressed in two ways. First, if
every end system with a publicly reachable IP (e.g. 128.163.4.50) is labeled such that
it can be distinguished from systems with private IP addresses, then the assigned label
could be included in PoLanCO statements that block traffic to/from a misconfigured
printer. Second, since some network printers are configured with an IPv6 address
that is globally unique, there is a potential risk for the printers to be reachable from
the Internet. Given that normally SDN controllers cannot push configurations to end
systems, the network operator could write a PoLanCO statement that blocks IPv6














Figure 3.16: Three printers in the network with their IP assignments
Fig. 3.16 shows a topology where three printers were (mis)configured and
labeled during the topology discovery phase. Naturally, the common label across all
the printers is PRINTER. However, note that the printer attached to SWITCH B was also
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marked with the label PUBLIC as it was assigned an IP address in the 128.163.0.0/16
public network. While the printer attached to SWITCH C was labeled with CPH (the
College of Public Health), the printer is still misconfigured and susceptible to being
accessed from the Internet via IPv6. Fig. 3.17 shows the network statements that
would enforce the printer security guidelines.
1 when node is connected to a PUBLIC PRINTER
2 then block all traffic
3
4 when node is connected to a PRINTER
5 then block ipv6 traffic
Figure 3.17: PoLanCO statements securing printers from external access
The first statement (lines 1-2) enforces the policy only at SWITCH B because it
is the only network device that is connected to a node with the labels PRINTER and
PUBLIC. The generated OpenFlow rule uses the printer’s IP address (128.163.53.5)
to block all traffic coming in and going out of the public printer. Similarly, for the
second statement (lines 4-5), the policy is enforced at switches A, B, C because they
are all connected to a node with the label PRINTER. In this case, a generic OpenFlow
rule blocking IPv6 traffic to the printers enforces the policy.
The rest of the guidelines such as disabling unnecessary services are similar to
the previous example (Section 3.5.1) where insecure protocols are disabled campus-
wide. For the printer example, the conditional part would not be omitted and instead
should identify only the nodes that have a printer connected to them. In addition, the
body part of the statement should block what the network operator consider as an
“unnecessary” service (e.g. HTTP, FTP, SNMP, etc.) from a printer management
perspective.
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3.5.3 Firewall for External Connections
Firewalls are often the first line of defense of any network, including campus networks.
It is not uncommon to see policies and guidelines for network traffic that is destined
to/from the Internet. Consider an excerpt from a policy involving the perimeter
firewall at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [113] shown in Fig. 3.18.
1 All UMSL network traffic to and from the Internet must go through
the firewall.↪→
2 Any network traffic going around the firewall must be accounted




Figure 3.18: UMSL Firewall Policy
Enforcing the core of the policy (line 1) is straightforward in PoLanCO. As-
sume the topology discovered during the network information gathering is the one
shown in Fig. 3.19. There are switches inside the network that send traffic out of














Figure 3.19: Example topology discovered at the edge of a campus network
The PoLanCO statements that enforce the policy are shown in Fig. 3.20
Both PoLanCO statements would subsequently be translated into the appro-
priate network configurations for both INNER and OUTER switches. The translation
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process will identify information such as the designated interface where packets must
be forwarded, and the IP addresses the rules need to match on (e.g. the campus net-
work is 134.124.0.0/16). Moreover, the blue link connecting the upper OUTER SWITCH
with the lower INNER SWITCH offers an alternative path to traditional routing proto-
cols (e.g. OSPF, BGP) that bypasses the firewalls. The PoLanCO statements force
all traffic to avoid the alternative route and appropriately send all traffic through the
firewall.
However, note that network operators can use a policy priority in the
PoLanCO statements to explicitly allow exceptions to the policy and allow the usage
of the path that bypasses the firewall. Likewise, the rest of the policy (line 2 in
Fig. 3.18) that discusses the allowance of exceptions to the policy (i.e. bypassing
the firewall’s inspection) could be enforced via an exception system such as the one
described in Chapter 5.
3.5.4 Rogue Servers
PoLanCO can enforce policies that forbid the deployment of rogue servers—a system
that is providing services to the network that IT staff is not managing. Take for
example the policy found at the Oberlin College and Conservatory [119] shown in
Fig. 3.21.
1 when node is an INNER SWITCH
2 then send to PERIMETER FIREWALL traffic from campus network to
Internet↪→
3
4 when node is an OUTER SWITCH
5 then send to PERIMETER FIREWALL traffic from Internet to campus
network↪→
Figure 3.20: PoLanCO statements enforcing a firewall policy
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1 In no case shall the following types of servers (except those
2 maintained by CIT for the express purposes delineated) be
3 connected to the network: DNS, DHCP, BOOTP, or any other server
4 that manages network addresses.
Figure 3.21: Network-based Intrusion Prevention Policy of the Oberlin College and
Conservatory
The key to enforce the policy is to distinguish between authorized servers and
regular hosts use two labels. By distinguishing servers from hosts it is possible to
block DNS and DHCP traffic destined to the latter. Note that it does not suffice to
solely block all of DNS and DHCP packets to enforce the policy because legitimate
end systems would be unable to resolve names or request a private IP addresses from
authorized DNS and DHCP servers. Instead, the BRMS should produce configura-
tions that only allow responses issued by authorized servers and block messages issued
by any other device (i.e. a rogue server). The PoLanCO statements are presented in
Fig. 3.22.
1 when node is connected to a REGULAR-HOST
2 then allow-only dns-response traffic from authorized dns server
3
4 when node is connected to a REGULAR-HOST
5 then allow-only dhcp-response traffic from authorized dhcp server
Figure 3.22: PoLanCO statements prohibiting traffic from rogue servers
Fig. 3.23 shows the translation of PoLanCO statements into OpenFlow rules.
First, the BRMS selects all the network devices that are connected to a REGULAR-HOST
node (i.e. SWITCH A and SWITCH C). Then, the allow-only action of the PoLanCO
statements (lines 1 and 4) produces two OpenFlow rules per selected switch. For
clarity, Fig. 3.23 only shows the rules enforcing the policy on (rogue) DNS servers
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but the procedure is similar for DHCP servers. Specifically, a rule with priority n
drops all DNS response traffic, thereby preventing messages originating from rogue
servers from reaching end systems; and another rule (with higher priority, say, n+ 1)
that explicitly allows response traffic coming from authorized servers to reach end

























Figure 3.23: Rules installed to prevent rogue servers
3.5.5 Other Policy Statements
We provided a detailed description of some of the policy statements found at various
university websites that can be written in PoLanCO in order to document, automate,
and trace network policies. This section presents other statements that were not found
in online policy documents but are typically enforced in a campus network.
Accessing SSH Servers: Besides VPNs, certain nodes in the campus network
might be allowed to be accessed from the Internet over an encrypted SSH
channel (possibly from specific IP ranges). Access to authorized SSH servers
can be explicitly specified using PoLanCO (see Fig. 3.24)
Deep-Packet Inspection: Even though so-called “Next-generation Firewalls” typ-
ically perform DPI, they are sometimes cost prohibitive for institutions that
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1 when node is a FIREWALL
2 then allow ssh traffic to campus network ssh servers
Figure 3.24: PoLanCO statements for access to SSH servers
1 when node is a FIREWALL
2 then send to IDS web traffic from Internet to authorized web
servers↪→
Figure 3.25: PoLanCO statements enforcing IDS inspection
have tight budgets for network infrastructure. As an alternative, dedicated
software-based IDSs (e.g. Snort [30], Bro [29]) are deployed at multiple places
in the network on commodity hardware that perform the DPI at slower speeds
but with a high-accuracy of detecting intrusions.
Fig. 3.25 shows a PoLanCO statement that sends traffic aimed at web servers
to an IDS once it has successfully pass through the campus firewall.
Offline Traffic Monitoring: There are occasions that, instead of doing inline DPI
that may become performance bottlenecks, network operators do offline analysis
of the network traffic traversing various portions of the network. For example,
network traffic is analyzed for capacity planning, usage trends, or outage de-
tection. Network operators may specify PoLanCO statements to copy network
packets out to a specific port. Fig. 3.26 show an example to analyze local DNS
traffic:
1 when node is connected to an AUTHORIZED DNS SERVER
2 then mirror to port 0 dns traffic from campus network
Figure 3.26: PoLanCO statements copying DNS traffic to a switch port
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Locking-Down Access to Printers: Section 3.5.2 described an example on how to
enforce policies that prevent printers from being accessible from the Internet.
The policy also required network operators to disable any unnecessary services
that could be potentially active by default. However, the policy did not prevent
any network user from sending print jobs to any printer on campus. In reality,
campuses typically impose tight restrictions on access to network printers (and
other types of devices such as cameras, IP telephones, streaming systems, etc.).
Access to printers is normally limited to members of the department where
the printer is physically placed. For example, the PoLanCO statements shown
in Fig. 3.27 that any printer in the Computer Science network may only be
accessed by members of the Computer Science departments using desktops (i.e.
no laptop, or mobile printing), blocking everything else. In short, two PoLanCO
statements are needed: (1) drop any incoming requests from a device that is
not part of the department’s network and (2) drop “print” requests coming
from the Computer Science network but are not desktops (e.g. a laptop over
wireless).
1 when node is CS FIREWALL
2 then block traffic to cs printers
3
4 when node is connected to a CS PRINTER
5 then allow-only print-jobs from cs desktops
Figure 3.27: PoLanCO statements locking down access to printers
Interactions in Emerging HPC Environments: Historically, HPC systems
have been governed by relatively simple security policies based on a combi-
nation of authentication, VPN and firewall technologies. However, in recent
years local cloud environments (e.g. OpenStack [120]) and distributed storage
systems (e.g. Ceph [121]) have emerged to complement the traditional offer
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of large supercomputer clusters provided by HPC centers. These emerging
systems are oftentimes formed with separate components that are connected
either through a single shared network or via multiple dedicated networks that
maximize system performance and scalability to their users. The architecture
of two of those systems is briefly described. Namely, an OpenStack deployment
and a Ceph storage system. Then, the types of access policies that are needed
are discussed. Specifically, policies that define and restrict valid access within
the systems’ components, and between the systems and the network users.
Ceph: In a Ceph environment, the main distributed resources are called Object
Storage Daemons (OSDs) and Object Storage Monitors (OSMs). The for-
mer are responsible for storing objects and perform replication and recov-
ery tasks, whereas the latter manage cluster membership and state. The
resources can be interconnected in many ways, for example, they could
be connected to a general-purpose network (like the campus network), or
they could be deployed on an additional network (e.g. using VLANs to
create a “Ceph network”). Ceph resources rely on three interfaces (e.g. the
RADOS gateway, block device interface, or Ceph’s file system) that act as
proxies that translate requests into Ceph-protocol messages from network
users to store/retrieve data from/to the campus network (see Fig. 3.28a).
In either case, network operators need to establish appropriate policies to
prohibit unauthorized access from hosts on the campus network to Ceph’s
underlying resources and web interfaces. For example, the network policy
should only allow authorized CephFS clients to reach CephFS server, only
authorized hosts to reach block devices (i.e. devices that can be mounted),
or ensure that the cluster network only moves traffic across OSDs. The
policies can be implemented in the network using SDN, and therefore, can
be expressed using PoLanCO statements.
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OpenStack: Like Ceph, OpenStack can be deployed either sharing the general
purpose network or by using a private management network used to pro-
vision and control OpenStack components. In the former, any machine on
campus would be able to reach/attack any component of the system, po-
tentially including VMs deployed and managed by other users. In the latter
(see Fig. 3.28b), network separation can help by making key components
of the system only accessible via the management network. In addition,
it is also possible to create independent external “provider” networks (i.e.
paths to the Internet) that ensure the traffic from VMs is isolated to an
appropriate VLAN. While the deployment of various physical (or virtual)
networks helps with OpenStack’s network security needs via isolation, the
approach falls short when it comes to the implementation of fine-grained
network security policies required to allow/prohibit interactions (e.g. sys-
tems, communication mechanisms) between (and within) components in
the management network (e.g. user A’s VM can be accessed from the
Internet via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)) and network users.
Dynamic environments such as Ceph and OpenStack have the potential
to experience a wide variety of network interactions within and between
both systems. Fig. 3.29 presents some of the policies that can be written in
PoLanCO that could ease the management of such interactions and ensure
that components are accessed by specific entities.
3.6 Final Remarks
We presented a translatable policy language called PoLanCO that allows network
operators to specify network policies in terms of human-readable, but technically
precise, statements when compared to the long acceptable use policies available online
on several university websites. The statements are written in an easy-to-read syntax
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Figure 3.28: Ceph and OpenStack architectures
1 when node is an OSD
2 then allow-only traffic from RADOS Servers
3
4 when node is an OSM
5 then allow-only traffic from RADOS Servers
6
7 when node is an OpenStack VM
8 then allow-only vnc traffic from campus addresses
9
10 when node is a firewall
11 then allow ssh traffic to openstack-network
Figure 3.29: PoLanCO statements expressing access policies in OpenStack and Ceph
systems
that leverages advancements in technologies such as BRMS and SDN. PoLanCO
uses a network information gathering phase to appropriately label network nodes
and utilizes the information as facts (i.e. source of truth) to enforce various types of
network policies. We showed several real-world example university policies, describing
how they can be written with simple PoLanCO statements, and how the statements
are translated into OpenFlow rules to ensure policy enforcement.
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Chapter 4. Network Security Caps: Separating Policy and Device
Configuration
4.1 Introduction
The traditional way of enforcing network security policies in current networks is
largely done by means of device configurations. Because network policies are often
needed to protect network servers from attack or to protect communication to/from
a network server (e.g., prohibiting cleartext protocols like HTTP to web servers or
FTP to file servers), network policies often end up being enforced by servers via their
configuration files, rather than by the network.
This approach towards network security enforcement should not come as a
surprise given that most servers already have a configuration file. While the config-
uration file is primarily there to define or specify the functionality the server should
offer, it is relatively easy to add a few statements to the configuration file that also
specify security policies. Besides, who better to protect a server than the server itself.
Enforcing network policies via configuration files conflates network security
enforcement with server functionality configuration, and it comes with some draw-
backs.
Independent Server Configuration: Every server must be configured (and se-
cured) independently. Therefore, securing the network via configurations re-
quires more work (i.e. it is challenging to scale and maintain independent
servers) and increases the chances for a server to be secured incorrectly (on
accident). On the other hand, doing security enforcement in the network only
requires securing the network (forwarding devices) and applies the same policy
to all servers.
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Users as Server Administrators: With personal equipment and user-managed
VMs deployment being commonplace in today’s campus networks, network
users cannot be trusted to enforce security policies on end systems (including
servers). For example, students in charge of configuring their laptops may not
be concerned about security when joining the network, students may also prefer
to use default configuration files to have services available out-of-the-box, or
students may not want to maintain their systems regularly. Having network
administrators be responsible of network security centralizes trust where it
should be – with a trained professional who cares.
Functionality and Policy: Because the configuration file is used to specify both
functionality and security, it is easy to enable (or disable) features that create
security vulnerabilities. For example, during the initial setup of a server, the
owner could forget to disable a feature that violates the network policy (e.g. re-
moving the HTTP port from the listening ports in web server configuration file
shown in Fig. 4.1). Whereas, network administrators think about security inde-
pendently of the current functionality that has been enabled (or disabled). In
other words, network administrators plan for all attacks, regardless of whether
the server functionality is susceptible to them or not.
Mitigating Attacks at the Server: If network security is enforced only at the
server, then attacks can only be stopped or blocked when packets reach the
server. This enables DoS or DDoS attacks that not only affect the performance
of the server, but may also affect the performance of other services on the net-
work. By securing the network, attacks can often be blocked far before reaching
the server itself.
Emerging network architectures such as SDN have enabled new opportunities











9 allow from all
10 </Directory>
11
Figure 4.1: Example configuration file of an Apache web server
agement (Section 2.3.4). As an example of potential uses of SDN technology to assist
with security, we introduce and describe the concept of Network Security Caps . The
main idea behind Network Security Caps is to use OpenFlow-enabled devices at mul-
tiple places in the campus network to separate the enforcement of security policies
from configuration files. Specifically, the separation is done by adding the ability to
intercept traffic going to or coming from end systems and apply policy to the net-
work packets of those traffic flows before they arrive at the servers that need to be
protected. Under this approach, we add a security layer to the network that protects
servers from violating security policies regardless of server misconfigurations. Rather
than replacing the way network policies are enforced today, we propose the security
layer as an additional control to minimize potential vulnerabilities in the network and
can be automated by using DSLs such as PoLanCO (described in Chapter 3).
4.2 Network Security Cap
Traditional networks rely heavily on configuration files and CLI commands to set
up network services and devices (switches/routers) in terms of the functionality they
provide and the way they should enforce high-level network polices defined by the or-
88
ganization. However, conflating functionality and policy enforcement poses a security
risk for the network.
Take for example the network device shown in Fig. 4.2. The network device
has multiple interfaces that are used to communicate with other devices and end
systems in the network. Once a network device has been successfully installed in
the network, it needs to be appropriately configured before any interface is actu-
ally enabled to forward packets. Network operators configure network devices via
CLI instructions specifying operational data such as the device’s name, availability
of SNMP Management Information Bases (MIBs), the network domain the device
belongs to, initial entries in the routing table (if providing L31 capabilities), adminis-
trative credentials for future management and maintenance task, logging directives,
VLAN association per port, to name a few. After the operator configures a device,
whenever traffic arrives at an interface, the device’s internal configuration (referred to
as normal pipeline) modifies and forwards network packets based on the current state
of the device’s internal data structures. The contents of the internal data structures
change over time depending on the type of device, the protocols that were enabled
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Figure 4.2: A generic network device
Moreover, any modification to the high-level network policy requires the net-
work operator to change the internal configuration of the device (e.g. updating
VLANs or default routes for certain destinations). Additionally, for policies that
1L3: Refers to the network layer of the OSI model [122]
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are solely implemented with configuration files or host-based utilities, there is no
mechanism in place to enforce the new policy on the network while the end system
is appropriately tuned and its configuration files updated to comply with the new
policy directives.
In order to aid with the timely enforcement of policies in the network, even
if they depend on the configuration of end-systems, we introduce the concept of a
Network Security Cap (NSC) enforcement layer. A NSC (Fig. 4.3) is an intermediate
security policy enforcement layer located inside network devices (switches/routers)
between the device interfaces—in charge of receiving and transmitting network
traffic—and the device internal configuration—used by the device’s data plane to
process packets and make decisions based on information inside the packet headers
and internal data structures. The NSC layer intercepts all packets arriving at a
device prior to any packet reaching the normal pipeline. Then, policy enforcement
rules evaluate packets and determine whether a packet should be (1) dropped if
it is not policy compliant (e.g. when traffic that uses protocols that transmit
information in clear text), (2) forwarded out (and possibly modified) off an specific
device interface (e.g. when traffic is part of an authorized exception), or (3) sent to
the normal pipeline if the packet does not violate the policy (e.g. when hosts are
resolving addresses via ARP messages).
A NSC is initially empty, thereby relying entirely on the policies enforced at
the end systems and the network devices as it happens today. As a result, NSC
can be incrementally deployed as enforcement points that initially do not interfere
with ongoing operations in the network. Nevertheless, a switch’s NSC also allows
the dynamic addition of enforcement rules. Rules can be of any type (e.g. Open-
Flow, Policy-Based Routing (PBR) [123]) as long as they precede the device’s normal
pipeline processing. As time goes by and policy changes, multiple security policies









Figure 4.3: The Network Security Cap
Network policy definition tools can leverage NSC-capable nodes to deploy
network-wide policies. For example, an operator writing network policies in a DSL
such as PoLanCO (described in Chapter 3) can generate various types of network
configurations and push them to NSC-capable devices for enforcement purposes. In
that way, any arriving packet at a device will be first evaluated against the policy
before it can be handled by the regular processing of the network device (if at all).
4.3 Deploying Enforcement Points in the Network
Network Security Caps can follow an incremental deployment approach that does not
disrupt ongoing communications. A Network Security Cap treats security enforce-
ment as an added service (as opposed to a security replacement) to the infrastructure.
As mentioned earlier, every deployed SDN device could be seen as a policy enforce-
ment point that protects a portion of the network from potential exploits arising from
system misconfigurations.
In order to achieve a seamless transition towards an NSC-enabled infrastruc-
ture, OpenFlow powered switches were utilized to realize the NSC enforcement layer.
Specifically, the OpenFlow pipeline is used as the NSC layer where decisions about
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policy compliance are made on a per-flow basis using OpenFlow actions (e.g. drop-
ping, modifying, forwarding, mirroring, rate-limiting) before the internal device con-
figuration does any further processing.
Unfortunately, the OpenFlow specification [64] has many features marked as
optional. Vendors may choose what parts of the protocol to implement in their
hardware, and consequently, make it harder to deploy SDN-enabled equipment in
networks due to the lack of standardization across many OpenFlow implementations.
Nevertheless, in general, there are two types of OpenFlow switches, namely,
OpenFlow-only and OpenFlow-hybrid. The former, which is typically used in proto-
types and systems reviewed in parts of Section 2.3, are considered “dumb devices”
that do not make any local decisions beyond those based on the rules present in the
flow tables. The latter are devices that support both OpenFlow operation and tra-
ditional forwarding that involves and relies on traditional protocols to perform L2 2
Ethernet switching and L3 routing. Naturally, OpenFlow-hybrid devices help realize
Network Security Caps in a campus network. They ensure that existing communi-
cations are not disrupted and an incremental approach is feasible. The deployment
OpenFlow-hybrid devices builds a campus-wide NSC enforcement layer that is viewed
as a an added security service to the network’s standard forwarding capabilities. In
addition to the operation in hybrid mode, the OpenFlow implementation embedded
in the switches must support the reserved port NORMAL that, unfortunately, is marked
as optional in the OpenFlow specification. The NORMAL port allows a switch to pro-
cess all packets received in any interface to go through the OpenFlow pipeline before
the normal pipeline (and internal configurations) takes over.
Given an OpenFlow-hybrid device that supports the NORMAL port, a new mode
of packet processing that differs from the reactive and proactive modes (see Sec-
tion 2.3.3) can be introduced in our SDN-enabled network . Unlike the reactive and
2L2: Refers to the data link layer of the OSI model [122]
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proactive packet processing approaches, which are oriented towards networks with
OpenFlow-only devices and where the default policy is to either send packets to the
controller or simply drop them, the default policy using NSCs is to send all policy-
compliant traffic to the NORMAL pipeline, thereby way guaranteeing no disruption of
communications. Fig. 4.4 shows how packets are processed when they reach a newly
deployed NSC at the access layer of the topology. The OpenFlow rule that matches
on all types of packets and forwards them to the NORMAL port (i.e. to the normal
pipeline) represent the default policy. Consider an HTTP request that is sent from
another system to the server on the left-hand side of the figure (green arrows). First,
the NSC process the packet matching it against the default policy since no other
policies are installed in the switch. Then, the packet is sent to the normal pipeline.
The device configuration determines the output interface for the packet based on the
device’s internal data structures (e.g. MAC table, routing table). Lastly, the packet
is delivered to the the web server process running on the server.
Note that a NSC does not affect packets that are used for route and topology
discovery using traditional distributed protocols (blue arrows). The only difference









priority: 0 match: * action: output=NORMAL
HTTP Packet
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Figure 4.4: Normal processing of packets at the access layer
Although NSC-compliant devices can be deployed at any place in the network,
we argue that the access layer is an ideal place for policy enforcement due to its
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proximity to the end systems (i.e. servers and clients).
4.4 Example Policy Enforcement
All of the examples that were presented in Section 3.5 leverage the NSC concept
described in this chapter as a way to translate human-readable policies into pol-
icy enforcement rules. The examples were mostly focused on the expressiveness of
PoLanCO and therefore addressed an individual policy (possibly spread out onto
multiple devices) at a time. For the sake of completeness, the example in this section
addresses an scenario where multiple policies can coexist in an individual NSC and
can help mitigating the risks of rather frequent server misconfigurations.
Continuing with the interactions described in the previous section, Fig. 4.6
shows a NSC that receives various types of traffic and enforces multiple high-level
policies that were specified using the PoLanCO statements shown in Fig. 4.5.
1 policy "disable telnet"
2 Block telnet traffic
3
4 policy "disable clear text web server access"
5 when node is connected to a WEB-SERVER
6 then block http traffic
7
8 policy "secure web server access"
9 when node is connected to a WEB-SERVER
10 then allow-only https traffic
11
12 policy "1 hour backup exception"
13 policy priority 10000
14 when node is connected to a SERVER A
15 then send to BACKUP-PATH traffic from server-a to aws for 60
minutes↪→































P: 5 M: [DSTIP=10.10.0.8] A: DROP
P: 6 M: [DSTIP=10.10.0.8, PORT=443] A: NORMAL
P: 0 M: * A: NORMAL
HTTP Packet
Backup Job
Figure 4.6: A Network Security Cap enforcing high-level policies
On the left hand side, the box representing Server A shows the applications
(services) that are currently running on the server.
The Server A’s primary purpose is to host a website. The system administrator
installed the Apache server on the system and changed its configuration file to add
HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) support because (1) HTTPS is disabled by default in the
software version she downloaded and (2) she is aware that web services should be
reached via secure protocols. However, the administrator forgot to disable HTTP
support in the configuration file. Therefore, there is a security risk for connections
trying to contact the server reaching on that port (many). Additionally, Server A
has a telnet daemon that (unknowingly) was turned on by the OS during its initial
setup. Lastly, the server is also running a database server that uses port 7474 to
provide a Graphical User Interface (GUI) (Fig. 3.10 and Fig. 5.5 are examples of
such interface) for running queries and executing database transactions. Access to
this GUI should be local (i.e. restricted to the localhost address 127.0.0.1), but, by
default, it is turned on and available for access from other addresses in the network
(i.e. the database service is misconfigured).
Let us consider the following network security policies that the server should
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have implemented but because of misconfiguration is currently violating. First, pro-
tocols that transmit information in clear text such as telnet should be disabled (lines
1-2 in Fig. 4.5). At present, state-of-the-art OSs disable telnet by default. However,
nothing prevents a system administrator to misconfigure the server (or use an old
OS launches a telnet daemon by default) and accidentally enable the service. The
PoLanCO statement enforces the policy generating the (green) NSC rule that prevents
telnet requests to succeed even if the server has the service turned on. Secondly,
consider a policy stating that all web servers on campus should only be accessed over a
secure HTTPS connection (i.e. port 443). Since the system administrator’s intention
was to enforce the policy via configuration, she should have disabled the HTTP fea-
ture (i.e. port 80) during server setup. However, if network operators use PoLanCO
and NSC to implement the policy (regardless of the the system administrator), NSC
rules that either drop HTTP (lines 4-6) or allow only HTTPS packets (lines 8-10) can
be installed in all network devices that have a web server connected (the yellow and
blue rules in Fig. 4.6 implement the latter). Now, since in this example the system
administrator forgot to disable port 80 in the configuration file, the network protects
Server A because the NSC separated policy implementation/enforcement from server
configuration.
Unfortunately, OpenFlow does not support negations to the traffic match por-
tion of a rule (e.g. matching on all traffic that is not port 80). However, installing
two (or more) rules in the NSC circumvents the limitation. Specifically, a rule with
priority P that drops all traffic to a particular node (e.g. using its IP address) and
multiple finer-grained rules with priority P + 1 that include the services and sources
that can access the node. In Fig. 4.6, the yellow rule forbids any request to reach
server A whereas the fine-grained blue rule enforces the policy defined in lines 8-10
by sending to the normal processing pipeline traffic that is targeted at the server
on the HTTPS port. Note that such rules implicitly protect the server from other
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misconfigurations. For example, attempts to access the GUI of the neo4j database
(port 7474)—that was mistakenly configured for public access—are denied. Last but
not least, let us consider a short-lived policy (lines 12-15)3 that allows servers to by-
pass the scrutiny of middleboxes during one hour in order to achieve high throughput
using a dedicated path for data backups to cloud storage services (e.g. AWS S3).
In this case, the exception could be deployed with a temporary high-priority
rule (10000).
The rule may perform transformations to traffic packets that are more complex
than what regular devices do before packets are sent out of an alternative interface
(e.g. the red rule rewrites VLAN number to 5 and forwards traffic out of interface 2 for
the matching packets). Note that unlike the HTTPS flow, the policy writers wanted
to avoid using the normal path for some reason – say because under the default policy
(i.e. priority 0) would have forwarded traffic out an interface that further in the path
contain a series of performance limiting middleboxes. This example shows that both
policies and temporary exceptions can be deployed in the campus using NSCs and
serves as a preamble of the exception system described in Chapter 5.
3duration is not part of the PoLanCO syntax presented in Chapter 3 but can be easily added
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Chapter 5. Enabling Short-Lived On-Demand Security Exceptions
Network security policies have been traditionally enforced by specialized network
appliances. Enforcement devices, often referred to as middleboxes [1], analyze and
process packets that traverse the network in a variety of ways to protect network users
and end systems from malicious actors. For example, it is not uncommon to find
devices such as firewalls, IDSs/IPSs, load balancers, or Network Address Translation
(NAT) boxes at various locations to enforce policies that mitigate attacks, and prevent
a variety of exploits. While middleboxes help network operators deploy policies, they
have two main drawbacks. First, middleboxes tend not to run at line rate due to
their complex packet processing pipeline, and second, they apply the same degree
of scrutiny to all packets in the network even though not all flows require the same
level of scrutiny as other. While there are high-end commercial solutions that solve
the former, oftentimes commercial appliances are cost-prohibitive for organizations
that have budget constraints. As a result, middleboxes often become bottlenecks that
cause network users to experience severe performance degradation and/or unexpected
behaviors to their flows.
Moreover, even if middleboxes were affordable and capable of handling line-
rates, their heightened scrutiny of user traffic has led to an adversarial relationship
between users and network providers. To ensure security, providers try to found out
what users are doing by performing Deep Packet Inspection (DPI. On the other
hand, users do not appreciate this meddlesome inspection and other downsides such
as going through a lengthy approval process to access a site/server, being subjects of
invasive monitoring, or experiencing poor performance.
We argue that this escalating arms race between users and providers is detri-
mental for both parties. Instead, we introduce an approach towards network security
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enforcement based on the concept of short-lived on-demand security exceptions. We
bring network providers and trusted users together by (1) implementing coarse-
grained security policies in the traditional way using conventional in-band security
approaches (i.e. via affordable middleboxes) and (2) handling fine-grained policy ex-
ceptions outside of the data plane using context information provided by the users
(or their applications) when a network flow is initiated or during the connection
establishment between both ends in the communication.
Under an exceptions approach both parties benefit. On one hand, trusted
network users divulge context information to network providers to receive special
treatment for their flows. On the other, by allowing security exceptions, network
providers not only reduce the load on traditional policy enforcement middleboxes,
but focus inspections on general (untrusted) traffic. This chapter describes the re-
quirements and design of a system that can allocate security exceptions on demand
and in real-time, as opposed to the manual, close-to-static, committee-driven process
to allow exceptions on campus networks. We highlight the relevant data structures
and technologies needed to establish trust relationships between providers and net-
work users, as well as the mechanisms and systems needed to deploy exceptions onto
the network infrastructure. Lastly, we report performance improvements we obtained
using a prototype exception system tailored to the transmission of big datasets to var-
ious storage systems and research facilities.
5.1 Middleboxes
The traditional way to enforce network security policies in a network requires the
physical deployment and individual configuration of dedicated appliances (also called
middleboxes). These network security devices have become highly sophisticated over
the years and are now pervasive across many types of networks including campus,
enterprise, cloud-based, and provider networks. Middleboxes provide several services
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and process network traffic in a variety of ways to ensure users and their applications
are protected. Typically, network appliances, which are deployed at key places of
the network infrastructure (e.g. at the network edge where campuses connect to
their regional ISP, in front of a server pool, as point of entrance to critical resources
like databases or file servers), intercept and perform some form of DPI on all traffic
moving through the network. Specifically, once packets are intercepted, a middlebox
analyzes the content of each packet (including not only headers but possibly the
payload) to find matching packets based on predefined network patterns or well-known
signatures, and then apply middlebox-specific processing to the matched packets. For
example, firewalls, that are deployed inline on the physical network path, drop or
forward packets matching certain (header) fields (e.g. IP addresses, port numbers,
protocol flags, payload structure); IDSs/IPSs perform DPI looking at payloads to
identify suspicious traffic and log, alert or block the activity based on packet frequency
or packet payload; NAT boxes serve as an interface between the Internet and a
private LAN where all hosts in the LAN have local/hidden IP addresses that must
be translated into one or more public addresses when talking to Internet endpoints;
load balancers distribute traffic across multiple servers ensuring that no single server
is severely overloaded, thus, contributing to the mitigation of DoS attacks and aiding
high availability.
Middleboxes are an integral part of network infrastructures because they not
only they keep the network secure, but they often provide additional services to
network traffic (e.g. content caching, QoS, rate-limiting). Although they have become
the de facto mechanism to enforce policies the complex processing these devices have
to go through—involving DPI—oftentimes causes them to be incapable of performing
at line rates.
In recent years new commercial solutions (e.g. Palo Alto [25], SonicWall [26],
FortiGate [27]) have emerged that can achieve (close to) wire speeds and offer traffic
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monitoring and policy management. These boxes are often cost prohibitive for or-
ganizations with tight budgets (e.g. schools, community colleges, startups and small
organizations). Consequently, the only options left is to acquire inexpensive middle-
to lower-tier devices or even deploy software-based solutions on commodity hardware
(e.g. Bro [29] or Snort [30] IDSs running on a Linux box). While these affordable so-
lutions are easy to deploy, they often become choke points in the infrastructure where
user flows can encounter a performance hit or unexpected behavior due to variable
packet throughput rates from the slow DPI.
In addition to this problem, note that even if these middleboxes were both
affordable and capable of handling line-rates, the fact that they have historically been
the preferred mechanism to enforce policies has led to an ongoing escalating arms race
between network users and providers. For example, providers deploy middleboxes to
block traffic destined to certain ports or addresses. In response, users tunnel traffic
over open ports (e.g., port 80) to get around these limitations. Providers, in turn,
deploy DPI to better identify the traffic traversing the network. Users then employ
encryption to thwart the providers’ DPI efforts, further intensifying the arms race.
Providers then rate limit traffic that exceeds a certain rate, threshold, or otherwise
looks suspicious, thereby continuing the escalation.
The deteriorated relationship between user and provider is harmful for both
parties. Providers have to inspect all traffic; both acceptable (legitimate) and offen-
sive traffic. Users feel their privacy is under constant invasion and their flows are
significantly degraded. To de-escalate the arms race we argue that both providers
and users should move away from an adversarial modus operandi where complex tech-
niques are continuously developed to obstruct each other’s needs, thereby making
network management harder, and legitimate network workflows unnatural. Instead,
users and providers should cooperatively participate in the compliance of security
policies.
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Specifically, if users share information about what they are doing, in return,
providers will allow user flow(s) to avoid the normal policy compliance checks. We
define these mutually agreed on safe flows policy exceptions.
Mapping higher-level policies perfectly onto network-level abstractions is a
hard task where at times middleboxes may not be able to precisely implement a
high-level policy (e.g. a policy for flows working on an NSF grant) thus, resulting in
collateral damage; middleboxes end up either over-protecting—blocking traffic that
does not need to be blocked, thereby limiting functionality—or under-protecting—
passing traffic that should have been blocked, thereby increasing risk.
A classical under-protection example is the deployment of a specialized DMZ
for research traffic—called a Science DMZ [124])—at the edge of the campus network
(i.e. the box hanging off of the campus edge router in Fig. 5.1). Unlike traditional
DMZs that are generally placed in between two firewalls (as shown in Fig. 2.2 and
Fig. 2.4) and whose purpose is to separate public access to corporate resources such
as web, DNS, e-mail servers from access to the LAN, the primary purpose of the
Science DMZ is to eliminate any bottleneck that involves DPI from the network
path in exchange of significant gains in network throughput. As a result, machines
that join the Science DMZ have to deal on their own (e.g. via software solutions)
against potential attacks from external (untrusted) entities as the protection offered
by firewalls and IPS/IDS is forfeited and there is a direct exposure to the Internet.
Additionally, campus network acceptable use policies are not enforced for devices in
the Science DMZ; thus, nothing prevents a user from abusing the granted privilege
and reaching unauthorized sites that otherwise would have been blacklisted by a
campus firewall.
Ensuring an appropriate degree of network security is always a trade-off among
various costs and benefits such as CapEx/OpEx, user (in)convenience, and perfor-




















Figure 5.1: Security implications of a Science DMZ
about the context of her workflows in exchange for special treatment against network
policies, first, by following an extensive and manual procedure that requires signa-
tures, justifications, forms, committee approvals, that for the most part is static;
and second, by registering a machine as part of a Science DMZ to achieve high-
performance throughput at the risk of being exposed and unprotected by otherwise
helpful middleboxes.
We re-examine the trade-offs involved in the current coarse-grained,
middlebox-based approach to enforce network security taking into account that
emerging technologies that enable programmability in existing campus networks can
cope with research environments that are complex and rather dynamic that expect
the network to adapt to their needs. Specifically, we propose a new approach towards
network security based on the concept of short-lived on-demand security exceptions
that leverages the network packet processing we described in Chapter 4 and uses
the control plane to remove the context unawareness of the middlebox-based policy
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enforcement approach for exceptional flows.
The fundamental concept of our proposal is to use traditional (and affordable)
security appliances (that have been optimized and hardened) to provide a base level of
coarse-grained policy enforcement on untrusted traffic, noting that the performance
costs increase with increasing policy complexity as well as traffic volume. To address
the issue of invasive scrutiny for legitimate traffic, we support the ability to establish
trust relationships between users and network providers using an authorization tree to
hierarchically divide segments of the network flow space into trusted regions. These
trust relationships can then be used to create fine-grained, short-term, trusted, on-
demand exceptions to the base policies. The exceptions are implemented using well-
defined protocols in SDN such as OpenFlow while keeping the cost of the base-level
down.
In addition, some enforcement decisions (i.e., whether to grant an exception)
are abstracted out of the data plane (i.e. the middleboxes) and moved to the control
plane (flexible and driven by software and automated mechanisms), where they can
be based on authenticated information provided by users indicating conformance (or
not) to higher-level policy. In other words, if trusted users are willing to inform
network providers about the type of traffic they will be using, their traffic may be
eligible to bypass the middlebox compliance checks—and associated costs—applied to
the traffic of other (less-trusted) users. More precisely, negotiated security exceptions
can allow users to bypass certain middleboxes, allow otherwise prohibited traffic to
temporarily traverse the network, or offer some level of QoS to authorized flows.
Exceptions might also be made to stop normally-allowed traffic as well, for example
to block or rate-limit unwanted traffic that would otherwise be delivered to a user
based on network conditions such as time of the day, or changes in role/affiliation.
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5.2 Exceptions as First-Class Entities
Most network policies are written in Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) documents describ-
ing allowable and expected user behavior, guidelines to protect IT resources in the
campus network, and the mechanisms used to reduce risk and mitigate attacks, among
others. While in the past such policies sufficed, current workflows are becoming more
dynamic and dependent on the services provided by the network, even for disciplines
that historically have not needed a significant amount of IT resources. Moreover,
there are occasions where compliance to such policies cannot be fully achieved or
by actually abiding by them could result in a major limitation (or disruption) of
legitimate workflows that are well-aligned with organization’s objectives and goals.
Research environments, in particular, have to cope with emerging workflows
due to recent technology trends in research (e.g. Big data, machine learning, cloud
computing, and IoT). Unfortunately, network security policies were designed for
general purpose traffic and have not been appropriately adapted to cope with newer
technological paradigms. Most institutions do not have the ability to create network
policy exceptions – i.e., grant a flow, or all flows from a machine, the ability to bypass
the normal network policy compliance checks.
Several institutions now support the concept of a Science DMZ that allows
researchers to move their machine outside the university firewalls into a Science DMZ
that is not subject to the university’s policy compliance checks – or the performance
overheads of applying those checks.
In a few rare cases, the university will allow researchers to request a network
policy exception for a certain well-defined flow. The network administrators must
review the request, and, if granted, manually configure the network to ensure the
requested flow does not go through the normal compliance checks. Although there
are slight variations in the actual steps among all institutions, the following procedure
shows the steps that need to take place before an exception is granted (modified or
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removed) on campus.
1. Request form from IT department. While some of these forms are publicly
available, some others can only be accessed through a shared folder or via e-
mail.
2. Fill out exception form and obtain signatures from department chair(s). The
form may include information such as the policy for which an exception is
requested, list of systems, networks, and/or data affected by the request, fully
qualified name of servers, detailed justification of requests, any attack mitigation
controls.
3. Submit form to IT department. This step can be typically completed via an
online form, an e-mail, and/or a hard-copy of the form directed to the office of
the CIO (or CTO)
4. Once the form is received, IT staff gather background information—not always
the user has knowledge of the low-level details of the network–and determine
if the case needs to be escalated or an approval/denial recommendation can be
made.
5. Contact requester if the information provided is not enough to provide a full
assessment of the request.
6. The process is halted until more information provided ultimately by re-
submitting an updated request that would require some (or all) of the tasks
required in step 2.
7. Final decision is made based on the information provided and feedback collected
after every stage. Should a request be denied, departments may appeal the
denial by submitting more information (justifying their case). Departments
may request extra meetings with IT to make a stronger case.
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8. Set a specific duration for the exception (3 months, 6 months, 1 year). It is
hardly possible to enable exceptions for short periods of time (minutes, hours,
days). The whole process is severely involved and could last longer than the
actual duration of the exception.
9. Review requests at time of renewal, ask users if exception need to be reaffirmed
or not.
10. If a significant change took place in the network or there was a change in policy,
all deployed exceptions need to be reanalyzed for newer approval.
It is evident that all these steps can be completed at best in the order of weeks,
and, as we pointed out, involve extensive manual checking, meetings, even paperwork.
In the end, the goal of exceptions is to arrive collaboratively at a win/win situation
where requests are handled in a fair, appropriate, and timely manner, where both
parties get something from working together.
While there are several drawbacks in the process: exceptions are the only
way network users can provide context and express their needs to justify partial
compliance to the security policies in place, and unlike the traditionally adversarial
approach for behavior in the network, exceptions provide a space to develop and
foster a cooperative and mutually respectful relationship between them.
The large number of steps to deploy an exception, and even the complexity
to maintain them, is what makes exceptions second class entities. In our proposed
approach, we treat exceptions as first-class entities. Our proposed security approach
splits the enforcement of network security policies into two pieces. First, network ad-
ministrators define general base network security policies to address common security
issues and concerns, and deploy them to middleboxes much as they do today. These
policies can be simple and even imprecise (e.g., over-protecting traffic and erring on
the restrictive side by blocking a wide range of ports) or slow (e.g., employing ex-
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tensive DPI). They can be deployed over long timescales as they are not intended
to change frequently and are meant to handle general-purpose traffic. Moreover,
since the types of policies expected at this level are coarse-grained, deployed us-
ing straightforward ACLs and lightweight filtering, or even software-based solutions,
their deployment is inexpensive (i.e. existing network infrastructure or commodity
hardware may be used) and scales well (performance cost is not critical).
The second part of our approach relies on making exceptions “first-class en-
tities” that override the base-level policies defined above. Unlike current practices
to treat special-cases in the network involving long timescales and several human
interactions, our exceptions are designed to be short-lived and can be requested on-
demand, thereby allowing the network to quickly adapt policy to meet the current
needs of trusted applications, or to address the current security needs of the network.
Providers (e.g., network operators, ISPs) grant policy exceptions to users—or their
applications—that supply (trustworthy) information about themselves and the net-
work traffic they will be generating. These dynamically created, flow-specific, limited
lifetime exceptions can be implemented using well-defined SDN protocols used in pro-
grammable networks such as OpenFlow [125], NETCONF/Yang [57], or ovsdb [56].
5.2.1 Example Exceptions
As noted earlier, exceptions enable both network users and providers to come to-
gether to “negotiate”. Users present their needs and justification for an exception
and providers vet those requests allowing them if partial compliance to the general
policy is outweighed by the consequences of enabling the exception. We present some
motivating example exceptions below where exceptions could simplify and enhance
operations in a campus network:
External SSH Access: Consider a policy exception that is dynamically created to
allow an authenticated collaborating researcher to use ssh from a specific end
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system in the Internet (e.g. a national laboratory), to punch through a campus
firewall and access a private git server containing shared data, without the
need to set up a VPN. The user might present the network exception system
with information about the authorized remote system, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) project associated with both the external collaborator and
the local researcher, the times of day the collaborator is allowed to access the
git server, etc.
Low-Latency Paths: As another example, consider a policy exception that allows
a highly interactive distributed application (e.g., a web conferencing application
or an interactive game) to utilize low-latency network paths (as opposed to the
default paths) among all participants in order to reduce delay, thereby improv-
ing the responsiveness of the application. The network should use information
presented by the user (similar to the example above) to provision the appro-
priate network links and paths that would ensure that constraints required by
such applications are satisfied.
Big Data Transfers: Consider an application that needs to move a large data set
between a national supercomputer facility and the local campus HPC super-
computer. In this case, the user might provide context about the transmissions
such as its frequency and duration (e.g. every weekday for two hours), type and
size of data, source and destination end points, or project-related information
(e.g. NSF grant, department project number, Principal Investigator(s)). Based
on this information, the provider might decide to allow a security exception
in which such application flows are (temporarily) routed around the network’s
IDS/IPS system to avoid its throughput-limiting DPI, thus enabling the flow
to operate at much higher transfer rates.
All three examples above illustrate cases where general network security policy
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imposes unnecessary costs on legitimate workflows. Under the traditional approach
towards network security, applications and workflows experience scenarios of constant
bandwidth rate-limiting, sluggish behavior due to network device overload (causing
high latency), or forbidden access to resources that should be shared. On the other
hand, on-demand exceptions allow users to disclose beforehand the details of their
traffic in order to justify their need for special treatment to the network provider.
Given this information, providers no longer need to subject these flows to the general
policy enforcement mechanisms and rather, as means of verification, can perform
offline passive monitoring for these flows (i.e. not affecting their performance) to
ensure granted exceptions are not used in unauthorized ways.
5.3 Exception System Design Requirements
We described in Section 5.2 the procedure that must be followed to request a policy
exception on existing campuses that support (static) policy exceptions. The proce-
dure is extensively manual. We consider this lack of automation a major setback to
effectively coping with the security needs that arise from the dynamics of research
environments. We also observed that emerging SDN network architectures, where the
control plane is separated from the data plane to enable network programmability,
present an opportunity to develop a policy system that can reconfigure the network
on-demand treating exceptions as their primary entities, and significantly reducing
the amount of work that humans have to go through during the request/approval
process.
There are several design considerations that must be taken into account in
order to implement such an exception system. We list them below:
Who can request exceptions? Naturally, defining what types of users can request
exceptions is of the utmost importance. Letting untrusted users deploy excep-
tions in the network could lead to security vulnerabilities inside the network.
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For example, we found that at times [126, 127], (static) exception requests are
accepted via e-mail using publicly available forms. While filters can be defined
to block non-institutional addresses, as we noted in Chapter 1, assuming that
any internal user is trusted is not a good policy. Instead, a better approach is to
authenticate users using their institutional credentials and against the role(s)
they are associated with. In that way, it is possible to narrow down the groups
of users that might request an exception (e.g. only faculty members and grad-
uate students may request exceptions) and mitigate unintended usage of the
exception system by both external and internal users.
Who grants the exceptions? Likewise, as we showed in Section 5.2.1, exceptions
must be vetted by the real-world authorities responsible for the network (e.g.
IT staff). In that way, the policy enforcement process is moved away from the
middleboxes, where every packet is (possibly deeply) inspected, to the control
plane, where network applications can make decisions based on high-level infor-
mation about the request. This is particularly beneficial for the performance of
the system because unlike middlebox-based enforcement, where decisions must
occur at (or near) line rate, control-plane decisions may take place on slower
timescales before exception flows are initiated. However, in order to avoid the
bottleneck of potential deliberations between organization units, trust decisions
should not be made by a single entity (e.g. campus IT), but rather should be
distributed in a controlled way among users to be able to scale the trust man-
agement system (see authorization tree below).
What is the scope of traffic that is subject to exceptions? Exceptions
should be granted to individual flows. Should a workflow involve the use of
an application that requires multiple connections (e.g. bwctl, rclone), multiple
exceptions, one per connection, must be instantiated. Exceptions should be
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associated with only the number of connections that are necessary for the
legitimate execution of a workflow. Unlike the Science DMZ approach, where
privilege (exception) is given to all the traffic to/from a set of machines (i.e.
exception is given out on a per host basis to a set of machines), an on-demand
exception system should lock down the privilege of by-passing compliance
checks to only a small number of flows; all other flows should still be subject
to DPI done by middleboxes. Note that deploying exceptions for fine grained
flows is challenging because some header fields are variable and cannot be
known in advance (e.g. source port, destination IP address resolved by a DNS
server). In such scenarios, the trust should be refined to precisely match the
flow as soon as the flow appears (see Section 5.5.2 for ways to achieve late
binding of flows to exceptions).
How to specify exceptions? Specifying exceptions is where the needs and require-
ments of network users can be described. The system should provide an interface
for trusted users to input information about their required flows. In order to
foster the automation of the system, exceptions should be structured using a
predefined syntax or markup. In this way, control software can be developed
to parse the contents of each exception and automatically transform the ex-
ception into network configurations. While there is no exception specification
standard, at a minimum, the defined markup should be equivalent for all units
in the campus network.
What information should be included in an exception? The mechanism
used to request exceptions must include information related to the context in
which the exceptions will be deployed. The exception request should include
information such as application IDs, grant/project numbers, laboratory/group
names, type of traffic being sent, etc. Unlike unstructured and paragraph
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justifications found in current forms to specify policy exceptions, context
information should be precise and verifiable in order to quickly determine
whether an exception is allowable or not.
What are the processing times for exceptions? Perhaps, the major problem
of the current approach towards policy exceptions is its inability to cope with
dynamic workflows that require near real-time deployments. Consequently, the
exception system should deploy exceptions dynamically and on-demand. Users
should be able to create (and tear down) exceptions in short timescales, avoid-
ing the delays caused by tasks such as discussions in committees, collecting
signatures for approval, scheduling meetings with IT staff, etc.
Backwards Compatibility. As noted earlier, varying degrees of security, yields
varying levels of user (in)convenience. An exception system should not require
a change in well-established legacy applications. Traditional tools such as SSH,
RDP, iperf, bwctl, rclone, etc. should be unaware of whether an exception is
being used or not. Likewise, traditional protocols used for route exchange and
network management (e.g. SNMP, OSPF) should operate as they usually do in
spite of the presence of policy exceptions. This will ensure that a campus net-
work with no exceptions will safely default to traditional security enforcement
mechanisms and no service is disrupted.
5.4 Implementing An Exception System
Taking into account the design considerations outlined above, we describe how those
requirements were handled in our implementation. Overall, the exception-based se-
curity model is divided in two main parts, first, an interface for network providers
to define trust (e.g. establish (on long time scales) which users are trusted to de-
fine exceptions for what portion of the flow space); and second, an automated re-
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quest/response system that applications or users can contact to ask that exceptions
be enabled in the network (on short time scales).
5.4.1 Defining Trust
A trusted flow is defined as a flow matching a portion of the flow-space controlled by
a trusted user. The first part of the on-demand exception system involves formulat-
ing high-level policies that define trusted flows–that is, the conditions that must be
satisfied for any connection to be associated with an exception. These decisions are
made on human timescales and often involve human validation of the policy. The key
to our approach is that trusted flows are defined before they are used. Campuses that
do support (static) exceptions do not manually validate every individual exception
as flows come in. Instead, they validate broad classes of traffic manually, and then
reconfigure the network to allow those flows to be created dynamically and automat-
ically by-pass middleboxes. Another difference of our approach from the traditional
enforcement of policies in middleboxes, is that the definition of trust policies asso-
ciates users/roles with specific flows—essentially to provide a “responsible party” for
each flow granted an exception. To allow delegation of responsibility, the mechanism
utilizes an authorization tree that arranges the set of all possible network flows, con-
ditions, and possible actions, into a hierarchy where each (child) node in the hierarchy
represents a subset of the flows, conditions and allowable actions, in the parent node.
One or more users (typically represented by a group) are then associated with each
node in the tree, giving them authority to define allowable exceptions for that por-
tion of the flow space. This way of handling trust, removes the burden from campus
IT staff (who are generally the root of the tree and have access to the whole net-
work flowspace) and allows users to delegate responsibility for certain flows to other
users, creating hierarchical authorization schemes consistent with the organization of
administrative responsibility in the Internet and within the institution.
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Exception Specification
The authorization tree is the place where information about the network users and
their network traffic is stored. This data structure validates exception requests against
pre-defined policies by users with varying levels of responsibility. Specifically, each
node in the tree identifies a portion of the possible flow space and has an associated
Exception Specification (ESpec) that contains high-level information that must be
satisfied by any exception request (e.g. who, what, when, where) as well as infor-
mation about the current status of the network (e.g., link congestion, overlapping or
conflicting exceptions currently installed, available resources, etc). While one could
envision ESpecs being written in a programming language as “plugins” to nodes in the
authorization tree, such a design would make it more difficult for network providers
to verify that a plugin is enforcing the policy correctly. As a result, ESpecs should
be specified in a high-level policy definition language (or specialized markup) that
could be easily compared against the intended policy exceptions without exposing the
complexity of low-level implementation details to deploy an exception. For example,
exceptions could be specified using human-readable sentences in PoLanCO (described
in Chapter 3) and be subsequently translated into the defined markup in order to
reconfigure the network. To provide an example of what an ESpec language might
look like, consider the markup syntax shown in Fig. 5.2.
Exception Request Type: Add | Remove | Update
Auth Credentials: User ID | App ID | Project ID
Match: <FlowSpec>
Action: Max Bandwidth Path | Min Latency Path | Min Hop Count Path | Block
Network Condition: Path Load < p | Time in [HH:MM, HH:MM]
Exception Duration: Flow Lifetime | n {days, hrs, mins, secs}
Figure 5.2: Example markup language for an ESpec
It is important to emphasize that the ESpec syntax presented in Fig. 5.2 may
be changed to include (or remove) other information that network providers might
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consider important to know from the users in order to deploy an exception. However,
it is critical that whatever information is included in an ESpec, it should not pose a
bottleneck in the deployment of an exception (e.g. triggering an e-mail sent to the
supervisor and waiting for her approval).
With the exception of the exception request type, which is the mechanism this
syntax uses to know the type of processing the automated system must follow, all
the ESpec information will be found in the nodes of the example authorization tree
described below and displayed in Fig. 5.3.
Navigating the Authorization Tree
The authorization tree of the exception system specifies the trust relationships among
multiple groups of network providers. Recall that the objective is to divide up the
flowspace in a hierarchical manner, delegating the task of defining allowable flow
exceptions to the (human) users responsible for those flows. In the context of a
campus network, the root of the authorization tree would be defined by the Campus
IT staff (Group: Campus IT) and would encompass all flows, actions, and network
conditions on campus (represented by the * character in each property of the ESpec).
In the example shown in Fig. 5.3, Campus IT delegates the definition of ex-
ceptions for secure copy and secure web (SCP and HTTPS) flows originating from
the College of Science (traffic: src=128.123.0.0/20,dstport=22,443]) to the IT staff
in the College of Science (Group: CoS IT). Likewise, Campus IT delegates to the
IT staff of the College of Communications possibility to deploy exceptions for all
incoming traffic whose destination is in the college, although only for short periods
of time (less than 10 minutes) between 9 and 10 am. Navigating down the tree, CoS
IT staff members might further delegate the definitions of exceptions for SCP and
HTTPS flows originating in the Biology Department (traffic: [src=128.123.0.0/24,
dstport=22,443]) to the IT staff in Biology (Group Biology IT). In this case, the
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exceptions may ask for maximum bandwidth or low latency paths but should only be
deployed in the network for the duration of the flow. For example, if the procedure
involves transferring a data set, the exception should be torn down once the data set
is successfully copied to the remote system and a TCP FYN packet is received at the
source. Moving further down, Biology IT staff might delegate the definition of scp
and https separately to different labs. For example, exceptions for traffic originating
in the Genomics Lab (traffic: [src=128.123.0.32/27, dstport=443]) are now limited
to bandwidth paths whose destination is Google Drive, Amazon Web Services S3
storage, or the local object store. The above indicates that exceptions for the Ge-
nomics lab are for data transfers for cloud storage systems, whereas the exceptions






































Figure 5.3: An Exception system authorization tree
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5.4.2 Prototype System Architecture
With an authorization tree in place, where policies are defined by dividing the flows-
pace, the second part of the exception system addresses the need to automatically
change the network state (e.g. using Network Security Caps described in Chapter 4)
to deploy (or reject) the requested exception.
The automated component of the exception system accepts exception requests
from trusted users that include all the information contained in an ESpec. Such
requests are made via a REST API call (recommended) or through a web interface
form that requires the user to enter the details manually.
The information in the request is evaluated against the authorization tree to
determine if an exception is allowed (e.g., checking validity of credentials, ESpec
format, valid request type, matches the flowspec, etc). If the user requesting the
exception is trusted for the portion of the flow space to which the ESpec belongs,
the system creates the exception by invoking SDN network management actions (e.g.,
computing OpenFlow rules, resolving domain names, learning location of the affected
end-systems, etc) to deploy the exception to the appropriate network elements.
To test and evaluate our approach, an on-demand security system as described
above was developed and deployed in the University of Kentucky. The system, called
VIP Lanes, leverages SDN equipment found at multiple locations of the network
and deploys exceptions by interacting with the SDN controller and installing (or
removing) OpenFlow rules in the SDN-capable devices to configure the network to
handle exception requests.
VIP Lanes is a secure and distributed system composed of modular and special-
ized components that perform deployment of security exceptions for high-throughput
paths. The overall architecture and the interactions among components are shown in










































Figure 5.4: The VIP Lanes exception system architecture
VIP Lanes Server: The only point of contact for users and their applications to
request an on-demand exception is through the server which can be considered
the heart of the whole architecture. In order to protect the exception system
from external attackers or snooping within the network, the server only accepts
requests from campus internal IP addresses using encrypted HTTP requests.
Furthermore, as the point of entrance to the system, the VIP Lanes server
uses the campus’ authentication services (LDAP) to ensure that only univer-
sity members can request exceptions. Once a user has been authenticated, her
exception request, which can be specified either via a web interface or by call-
119
ing the server’s REST API with a personal private key, is evaluated against
the authorization tree created by the network administrators. Upon success, a
deployment service is triggered to handle the request and translate the excep-
tion request into the appropriate configurations to the underlying network (see
Section 5.4.3). As described shortly, the translation process of the VIP Lanes
system requires querying detailed information about the network topology, in-
formation stored in a graph database. Because both the authorization tree and
the topology database store sensitive information about the network and the
policies, only local processes in the VIP Lanes server can reach them.
Topology Database: The deployment of exceptions for dynamic workflows require
the exception system to maintain an accurate view of the network. VIP Lanes
leverages current advances in NoSQL databases, particularly graph databases,
and uses the Neo4j graph database to store detailed up-to-date information
about the network based on information discovered by the SDN controller (e.g.
hosts, SDN switches), SNMP (e.g. routing capabilities, VLAN information,
MAC tables), and external data sources provided by the network administrator
(e.g. location of certain middleboxes). The collected information is significantly
broader than what SDN controllers provide. Graph databases are beneficial for
VIP Lanes due to the following reasons:
• the Cypher graph database language – a declarative query language for
Neo4j that simplifies the maintenance of topology data and provides an
intuitive syntax to construct constrained queries, including path compu-
tations;
• a direct mapping from a network topology (devices, links) into the same
representation in the database using nodes and edges. Further, the ability
to manipulate sets of labels assigned to the stored elements allows the
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representation of more complex network abstractions like active flows, IP
addresses, topology snapshots, and virtual network functions (e.g., NAT);
• the ability to store heterogeneous collections of data as properties of el-
ements in the network such as DPIDs for switches, MAC addresses for
hosts, and bandwidth capacity for links; and
• an intuitive GUI (Fig. 5.5) that allows network operators to view current
(and past) topology information, and to ask simple questions that are oth-
erwise tedious to implement in imperative programming languages (e.g.,
“what active flows go through switch X and avoid middleboxes of type T?”).
The prototype implementation is limited to the type of paths – e.g. widest,
fastest, etc. However, as presented in Chapter 6, it could be extended to
support exceptions and policies based on Neo4j queries.
Proxy Server The VIP Lanes proxy server acts as a gateway to access the SDN
controller. The security exception system is a novel approach towards collab-
orative policy enforcement between users and providers. For example, as con-
firmed by experimental results, security exceptions for the transmission of big
data transfers yielded a significant performance boost for campus researchers.
However, the system could also open up potentially dangerous new avenues
of attack—including attacks where an attacker could gain complete control of
the underlying programmable network by breaking into the VIP Lanes server
or the SDN controller. The fact that the exception system consists of several
components that interact with the SDN controller creates a reasonably broad
attack surface. Consequently, it is critical to secure the VIP Lanes exception
system itself by analyzing and tightly constraining each of the requests that
are sent to the controller. This is necessary because usually the NBI of exist-
ing SDN controllers enable a wide range of network management operations
that are not needed by the components of the exception system. Moreover, the
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access control mechanisms present in the controllers are very limited, to the
point that some of them (e.g. Floodlight, RYU, or POX) do not provide ac-
cess control for REST-based APIs whatsoever. The Aruba VAN [55] controller
used in the prototype supports very limited Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
that currently provides a single role with access to all controller features (i.e.
sdn-admin), giving far more control than is needed by the VIP Lanes exception
server.
If attackers were to gain access to the sdn-admin role, they could bring ports
up/down, capture any packet, inject traffic, overload the switches with control
messages—all being capabilities not needed by the VIP Lanes exception system.
To reduce the risk of attack but yet work with existing controllers, the VIP
Lanes Proxy is the only entity authorized to access the SDN controller’s APIs.
All requests to the controller must go through the VIP Lanes Proxy that inspects
the API calls and blocks any requests that invoke controller capabilities not
needed by the exception server. In addition, the VIP Lanes Proxy serves as a
certificate authority, signing client certificates (i.e. one for each component in
the VIP Lanes system) so that clients can be identified and associated with a
list of APIs they are authorized to invoke (i.e. a whitelist). (Note that if the
SDN controller has no access control, a firewall – either standalone or on the
controller, say via iptables – is needed to ensure packets cannot bypass the
VIP Lanes Proxy to reach the controller.)
The data structure used to implement the VIP Lanes Proxy whitelist function-
ality is a map of clients (identified by the Common Name (CN) field of their
signed certificates) to URLs (REST endpoints) that components are permitted
to use (including the HTTP commands they are allowed to use per endpoint).
Table 5.1 shows example whitelist entries, where the URLs are specified as
extended regular expressions to narrow down the action field. For example,
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the first entry enforces all VIP Lanes management calls to use vlanes-specific
structured cookie identifiers, isolating on-demand exceptions from the default
general policies controlling campus traffic, and obscuring the meaning of an
identifier from would-be attackers.
On a similar note, if an attacker compromises a component such as the moni-
toring system and then asks the SDN controller (via the VIP Lanes Proxy) to
make a change to the network, its connection to the VIP Lanes Proxy would
be ignored by the VIP Lanes Proxy, reducing the risk of an attack on the mon-
itoring system. Moreover, if the attacker requests a resource that it does not
have permission to (e.g. install a flow), its connection will be dropped, and
therefore the risk of corrupting the network operation is minimized. Note that
in this case, the attacker would still be able to use the customized statistics
API. However, this is a very limited read-only operation that would cause no
harm to the campus network.
The VIP Lanes Proxy default action for unauthorized requests is to ignore/drop
the connection. However, the VIP Lanes Proxy could take more complex actions
like reporting the incident to the network operator, or forwarding the traffic of
the compromised component to a honeypot to learn more about the modus
operandi of the attacker.
Table 5.1: Example whitelist entries in a VIP Lanes Proxy
Cert CN Field Authorized SDN Controller APIs HTTP Commands Allowed
vip-site.uky.edu ^/sdn/viplanes/ab01[a-f0-9]{12}$ GET, POST, DELETE
vip-site.uky.edu ^/sdn/v2\.0/of/datapaths/[^/]+/ports/[^/]+$ GET
vip-stats-db.uky.edu ^/sdn/stcl/stats/counters$ GET
SDN Controller Campus OpenFlow-enabled devices were paired with the Aruba
VAN SDN controller [55]. Besides the built-in modules that allow the SDN
controller to provide basic services like a web-GUI, REST APIs for simple
management and individual rule installation, discovery of OpenFlow-devices
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and end-hosts via DHCP or their own neighbor discovery protocol (BDDP),
the VIP Lanes exception system implementation consists of four management
modules:
• Management Module: Central module whose purpose is to process au-
tomated requests coming from the path computation service and add, up-
date or remove VIP Lanes from the network.
• Global Topology Module: Provides mechanisms to maintain versioned
snapshots of the existing connections in the network as well as a cache of
hosts learned via ARP messages.
• Statistics Collector Module: A multi-threaded application that peri-
odically queries/polls switches for byte/packet counters of the installed
VIP Lanes.
• DNS Sniffer Module: A helper module for cloud storage providers that
do not provide fixed IP addresses for data transfers (e.g. Google Drive,
Amazon S3). The module extracts resolved IP addresses from DNS re-
sponse packets issued by the storage provider before the transmission is
initiated.
SDN-Enabled Network The network where exceptions are deployed comprising
several NSCs (described in Chapter 4) as well as the end systems attached to
them. In order to join the SDN network (and instantiate VIP Lanes), buildings
(and departments) have to deploy at least one NSC-capable device—typically
a distribution and/or an access switch/router—and attach it to the SDN core
making sure that all general-purpose traffic is routed to the campus “normal
core” by default thus, preventing disruption of regular service to network users
(Fig. 5.8). Today, there are more than 14 buildings in our campus network
that have joined the SDN network and are eligible to deploy on-demand excep-
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tions, including departments of disciplines that historically have not involved
advanced IT tasks as part of their workflow but now benefit from the exceptions
that they are allowed to deploy. While the VIP Lanes system is currently stable,
complex tested networks needed to be created during the development phase of
the system [128]. The testbeds resembled (most of) the behaviors found in the
production network (e.g. inter-VLAN routing, IP address assignment, middle-
box bottlenecks) and ensure that security concerns were mitigated. There were
three iterations of the testbeds with increasing degrees of reality (and complex-
ity). The first deployment was in a controlled environment in GENI [42], made
entirely of software switches and therefore isolated from actual campus traffic.
Then, a laboratory testbed comprising hardware switches (Aruba 3500/3800)
that, in spite of running multiple OpenFlow (virtual) instances, gave us a closer
to reality scenario and allowed the control software to be tested before rolling
it out to production. Lastly, the system was tested in a limited portion of
the campus network that included systems located in the Computer Science
department.
5.4.3 Deploying Path Exceptions
Fig. 5.4 showed that after an exception is validated against the main authorization
tree an exception deployment service is triggered in order to deploy the user request
in the SDN network. In the VIP Lanes system, the path computation service deploys
exceptions. The service attempts to find a middlebox-free path with the information
provided by the user in the ESpec.
While the path computation could be written in a conventional imperative
programming language by calling existing graph libraries [129, 130], computing the
custom paths needed by VIP Lane would require tailoring the path computation al-
gorithms included in these libraries to handle networks made up of heterogeneous
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elements, which is an error-prone and time-consuming task for a network program-
mer/operator. Instead, we opted to leverage the built-in capabilities of the Neo4j
graph database to perform the path computation and topology data maintenance
within the database.
Figure 5.5: Neo4j GUI displaying the current topology, list of existing labels in the
database, and detailed information assigned to the highlighted “sdn” node
Currently, VIP Lanes is capable of calculating three types of paths: the fastest
(for low-latency requests), the widest(for high-bandwidth), and the shortest (for de-
fault routing). The fastest path query chooses the route based on the sum of latencies
of all links on the path; the widest path query chooses the route with the maximum
(greatest) bandwidth capability of the minimum-bandwidth link in a path; the short-
est simply chooses the path with fewest hop counts. While Neo4j provides a built-in
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function for the shortest path, two declarative queries to compute the fastest and
widest paths were constructed using Cypher. The queries are shown in Fig. 5.6.
Minimum Latency (fastest) Path
1 MATCH (src {ip: srcip})-[:version]-(current:CURRENT),
2 (dst {ip: dstip})-[:version]-(current)
3 WITH src, dst
4 MATCH p=(src)-[r:link*..{}]-(dst)
5 WITH p, reduce(Latency=0, r in relationships(p)) |
6 Latency + (r.latency)) as TotalLat
7 ORDER BY TotalLat
8 RETURN EXTRACT (n in nodes(p) | n.name ) AS names,
9 EXTRACT (r in rels(p) | r.vlan ) AS vlans,
10 ...,
11 EXTRACT (n in nodes(p) | labels(n) as labels,
12 LIMIT 1
Maximum Bandwidth (Widest) Path
1 MATCH (src {ip: srcip})-[:version]-(current:CURRENT),
2 (dst {ip: dstip})-[:version]-(current)
3 WITH src, dst
4 MATCH p=(src)-[r:link*..{}]-(dst)
5 WHERE ALL (n in NODES(p)
6 WHERE SINGLE(m IN NODES(p) WHERE n.name=m.name))
7 WITH p, EXTRACT (c in RELATIONSHIPS(p) | c.bw_cap)
8 AS bwidths
9 UNWIND bwidths AS b
10 WITH p, MIN(b) AS Bandwidth '
11 WITH p, length(p) AS Hops '
12 ORDER BY Bandwidth DESC, Hops ASC
13 RETURN EXTRACT (n in nodes(p) | n.name ) AS names,
14 EXTRACT (r in rels(p) | r.vlan ) AS vlans,
15 ...,
16 EXTRACT (n in nodes(p) | labels(n) as labels,
17 LIMIT 1
Figure 5.6: Cypher queries to compute the fastest and widest paths
All three types of paths are middlebox-free. Relevant middleboxes and non-
SDN devices present in the network (red nodes in Fig. 5.5) are identified in the
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database primarily through manually entered JSON-encoded configuration files that
contain descriptions of the interfaces present at every middlebox (e.g., MAC and
IP addresses, or neighbors). In some cases, these middleboxes may be discovered
by the controller as hosts, and consequently, the path computation service uses the
information stored in the configuration files to override the type of node that needs
to be stored in the database.
When a path query is run in Neo4j, it returns not only the nodes and edges
along the computed path, but also a selection of label and property data for each
node and edge. The topology information is vital to the successful construction of
custom exception paths because it describes what each OpenFlow switch must do in
the selected path; thus, enabling NFV in the SDN network. The control software
parses the topology information obtained from the database query and maps it into
OpenFlow rules that the SDN controller installs at every NSC along the path. The
generated rules ultimately dictate the behavior of every individual NSC for every
approved exception. Consequently, it is common to have “multi-function” switches
(like the sdn node in Fig. 5.5) that operate differently based on the location of the
end hosts in the computed path. For example, for on-campus transmissions (e.g., “a
transfer from the Computer Science department to the Physics department”) the sdn
node behaves as an L2/L3 switch that rewrites MAC addresses or VLAN tags for every
packet header in a flow. Additionally, that same switch functions (simultaneously)
as a stateless Network Address Translation device that hides IP addresses of the LAN
for flows going off-campus (e.g., “sending data to a national lab”). The flexibility of
graph databases helps store not only the de facto NAT table, but also the set of
public IP addresses to appropriately assign and produce OpenFlow rules that rewrite
the source and destination IP addresses of packet headers for outbound (i.e., from
the campus) and inbound (i.e., to the campus) exceptions going through the SDN
network.
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All path calculations require an accurate representation of current network
topology in the graph database to prevent packet drops or forwarding traffic to re-
stricted parts of the network. Since the network topology changes over time, the
changes must be recorded in a timely manner to ensure that the database topology
accurately reflects the current state of the actual topology. The up-to-date topology
information is maintained through the versioning algorithm described in the next
subsection.
5.4.4 Topology Versioning
Deploying exceptions requires an accurate view of the network. The challenge lies
in determining the frequency of topology data updates without compromising effi-
ciency. Ideally, the topology stored in the database Tdb should always match the
actual topology Tc (known by the controller) at any given time. However, proactively
maintaining Tc == Tdb at all times is expensive and adds unnecessary overhead: if no
exceptions are requested for a period of time, it is wasteful to continuously update
Tdb. An alternative approach is to check if Tdb == Tc before each path query is
executed and update Tdb if the condition is not met. The latter approach eliminates
unnecessary topology updates. However, it adds a user-noticeable delay to the path
calculation process as the topology grows. To tackle this problem, we implemented a
topology versioning algorithm. Fig. 5.7 illustrates how the mechanism operates when
components of the architecture trigger relevant events.
When the controller boots up or a new version of the topology module is
deployed (light-gray box), Tc represents the topology learned by the controller. A
random 64-bit number vc is the version of the topology stored in Tc. We define a flag
Tc req that indicates whether the topology has been requested by the path computation
service or not. Later, when the controller detects a topology event (yellow elements),
the version number vc is increased by 1 iff (1) the event is different from a host
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joining or leaving the topology—a frequent event based on a controller cache timeout
that is updated whenever the controller sees a packet from a host—and (2) the path
computation service has requested a newer version of the topology. Both conditions
ensure the algorithm avoids the situation where Tdb is constantly being updated even
though the path computation service does not currently need the latest version.
Figure 5.7: Topology versioning mechanism flow chart
When the database is initialized, Tdb is initialized to the current value of Tc.
Likewise, the database version number is initialized to the controller’s version number
(i.e., vdb = vc). Later, when VIP Lane request comes in via the path computation
service (white elements), the path computation service calculates the VIP Lane path
using Tdb and sends the computed path along with vdb to the controller to actually
install the SDN path. When the controller receives the request, it first checks if
vdb is equal to the vc (i.e., the topologies are in sync). If so, OpenFlow rules are
generated and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the controller realizes the path
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computation service needs a newer version of the topology (by setting Tc req = True),
and rejects the current path installation request.
As a result, a response message is built including the most recent values of vc
and Tc. Once the response gets back to the path computation service, current data of
Tdb and vdb is archived as an old version in the Neo4j database, and new snapshots are
added the Tc and vc values provided in the response. After this update, the process
starts over again and the path calculation is done on a more recent topology snapshot.
5.5 Evaluation
This section presents performance measurements collected when deploying on-
demand exceptions and sending/receiving data to common sites used by researchers
and scientists in the campus of the University of Kentucky. The factors affecting big
data transfers when the network is not the bottleneck are analyzed. The analysis
shows that the tool used to perform transfers has a significant impact on the final
performance of a transfer.
5.5.1 Throughput Measurements to ESNet Sites
In the first set of experiments, VIP Lanes exceptions were deployed to measure the
throughput at various locations on the campus network (Fig. 5.8) to reach sites that
are known to be used for research activities and therefore, can be trusted (i.e., are
allowed to by-pass campus network policy compliance checks).
Specifically, the bwctl [131] program measured the throughput from one of
the University of Kentucky campus libraries (KSL), the Computer Science depart-
ment (JFH), a newly built science building (JSB), and the department of agriculture
(AG) to ESnet sites located in various geographic regions of the United States (San
Diego, Washington D.C., and Chicago) and to the Data Transfer Node (DTN) at the




















Figure 5.8: SDN-enabled campus topology used to deploy exceptions
In order to eliminate the influence of variations in the client machine specifi-
cations used in each of the campus buildings, all the tests were run on a Macbook
Pro with an Intel Core i5 processor 2.4 GHz, 16 GB RAM, and an external Thun-
derbolt2 10G adapter attached to it. Additionally, jumbo frames (i.e. MTU 9000)
were enabled in the client machine as well as in all the VLANs used to perform the
transfers. Lastly, some variables of the system’s TCP/IP stack (e.g. TCP window
scale factor or receive buffer) were tuned following the recommendations published
by ESnet [132] to maximize the performance during each test.
For each site and building we measured two throughputs. First, the perfor-
mance obtained by letting the Normal campus network security appliances inspect
packets to enforce policies. Then, short-lived on-demand security Exceptions were de-
ployed to send data from the laptop to the trusted sites and the performance over the
middlebox-free exception path was measured. Note on rule installation times:
We observed that on average, it takes 314 ms to deploy each exception in the data
plane. Since deploying an exception happens as part of a big data transfer, it has
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almost no impact on the performance.
Table 5.2 shows the data collected after running the above experiments. At a
first glance, it is clear that using the VIP Lanes exception mechanism researchers in
most cases could benefit from a performance boost from tens of megabits per second
(under normal conditions) to multiple gigabits per second (using exceptions). Un-
surprisingly, the improved throughput was affected by the geographic location of the
trusted site, e.g., speeds to the DTN reached close to 7.2 Gbps whereas measure-
ments at San Diego (on the opposite coast of our campus) were below the 700 Mbps
mark. Nonetheless, as can be seen in Fig. 5.9, the speedup factor, i.e., how much
faster the throughput is by using exceptions, was not necessarily bound to geographic
location. For example, the improvement from AG to the DTN was only of 11x the
normal throughput, whereas from that same location to Chicago ESnet site the factor
jumped to 50x. In most of the cases, the speedup factor was higher than 20x with
only two data points below.
Note that for certain workflows (e.g. Big Data transfers) the specs of the
client machine are expected to be more powerful than those of the laptop used to run
the tests. Therefore, these results could serve as a baseline or reference point of the
potential improvements that can be obtained using more capable systems.
5.5.2 Exceptions for Transmissions to an External Cloud Provider
Transferring big data to various cloud storage providers is becoming increasingly im-
portant in recent years. There are multiple factors affecting the performance of big
Table 5.2: Throughput from four campus buildings to trusted sites
Site KSL JFH JSB AG
San Diego, CA 31.3 (669) 28.8 (671) 31 (669) 19 (663)
Chicago, IL 182 (3959) 36.4 (3129) 95.4 (3974) 74.1 (3707)
Washington, D.C. 70 (1289) 29.4 (1400) 69.4 (1570) 56.7 (1532)
DTN 300 (7120) 67.7 (7140) 320 (7200) 644 (7123)
*The numbers are shown as Normal (Exception) throughput in Mbps
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Median
Figure 5.9: Speedup factors at different sites using exceptions
data transfers that range from the capabilities of the end-system, the cloud storage
provider policies, the network infrastructure, the size of the data, the geographic lo-
cation, the data transfer tool, and many more. Analyzing the optimal combination
of parameters is out of the scope of this dissertation but we presented results in [133]
where we showed that Amazon S3 and Google Drive provided the best performance
overall and the rclone data transfer tool provided the best performance to its con-
figurability and back-off mechanism to efficiently and reliably move data to external
stores. We also identified that rclone outperforms all other cloud transfer applica-
tions. Consequently, we have recommended rclone to researchers on campus as the
tool of choice. Among cloud storage providers, Google Drive has become very popu-
lar among researchers both because of its good performance and cost (free unlimited
storage). Therefore, the analysis in this dissertation will focus on using rclone to
transfer data from campus file servers and desktops to Google Drive.
This section explores performance as it relates to the location of the re-
searcher’s machine in the campus network and the tool parameters used in the trans-
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fer. Two types of end-nodes where researchers “live and work” were analyzed: (file)
server nodes that have substantial computing power, and desktop nodes that are
more resource constrained. In both cases, nodes are located deep inside the campus
network. Similar to the previous experiments, the major problem with data transfers
transfers is that the path to the cloud has to go through various security middleboxes.
The Problem of Moving Targets
While in the previous measurements the ESnet sites and the campus Data Transfer
Node (DTN) had fixed IP addresses, transferring data to both Amazon S3 and Google
Drive is challenging because they implement moving target defense practices [134]
that dynamically change the destination IP address of the cloud storage system. This
situation gets more complicated when the tool used to transfer data can issue multiple
parallel connections (e.g. rclone) for an individual workflow because it is necessary
to obtain the destination IP for every individual connection, deploy an exception for
that connection, and finally start the transfer. In addition, for high-end machines that
have a large number of CPUs, the likelihood of some connections resolving to the same
IP address significantly increases. In such cases, only the source port number selected
by the data transfer tool would differentiate the individual connections. Although
with Amazon S3 is possible to circumvent this problem by preemptively querying the
list of subnets assigned to a particular region (e.g. east-1) [135] and use the returned
ranges as part of the OpenFlow rules, other storage systems such as Google Drive
do not officially advertise the ranges of public IP addresses used to store files in the
cloud.
In order to develop a solution to this problem, we inspected the packet cap-
tures from a host pushing data to Google Drive using rclone with multiple parallel
connections. We observed that, as part of the initialization process, multiple DNS
request/reply packets were generated before the actual TCP sockets were created. In
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fact, the tests showed that in general the number of DNS calls was equivalent to the
number of parallel connections. By further inspecting contents of the DNS packets,
we realized that the A RECORD field in the DNS reply packets contained a list of IP
addresses offered by the remote storage system to start the transmission; in 99% of




























































Figure 5.10: DNS Sniffer module packet processing to deploy exceptions per connec-
tion
A DNS sniffer module for the SDN controller was developed to leverage the
above findings, consequently, allowing researchers to dynamically deploy exceptions
for data transfers to storage systems with no fixed IP addresses. Fig. 5.10 shows all
the events and processes required to deploy such “on-the-fly” exceptions.
To start off, whenever there is a request for an exception to a cloud storage
system (say “Google Drive”), an “intercept rule” R is added to the flow table of the
closest OpenFlow switch connected to the host initiating the transfer. The rule has
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a short timeout (less than two minutes), a higher priority than any other rule, and
instructions to send to the controller all DNS reply packets (source port 53) whose
destination address is the one of the host (1.2.3.4 in the figure). Then, the user may
initiate the transmission with rclone (or any other tool) possibly issuing p parallel
connections. As mentioned earlier, the tool generates p DNS request packets that are
forwarded to a valid DNS server using the “normal” campus network. Note that it
is irrelevant whether the DNS server is local or external (e.g. using Google’s DNS
8.8.8.8). Once the DNS server issues a reply, R instructs the switch to send the
packet to the controller where its contents are processed by the DNS sniffer module.
Upon receipt of the packet, the controller extracts information from the packet such
as the Canonical Name (also referred to as CNAME) of the destination host and the
A RECORD containing the list of IP addresses that can be used to reach the remote
site. Once the information is stored in memory at runtime, the module must check
whether the extracted CNAME is in an authorized list of storage system mappings.
For example, for an exception to Google Drive the only two accepted CNAME val-
ues are googleapis.l.google.com and googlehosted.l.googleusercontent.com.
The validation step is necessary since R intercepts all DNS responses issued to the
host during a two minute window. The DNS responses could possibly include mes-
sages sent to services other than the data transfer tool (e.g. a web browser, an SSH
connection). For non-data-transfer cases, the DNS reply is simply sent back to the
switch and then forwarded to the host for normal processing.
However, if the CNAME is included in the authorized list of storage system
mappings, then the first IP address in the A RECORD is included in the request issued
to install an exception to the VIP Lanes Management Module (VMM). The VMM
prepares the corresponding OpenFlow rules, stores in a local cache the requested VIP
Lane, and submits the rules to the NSCs that will carry the traffic of the exception.
In order to prevent a race condition between the installation of an exception and
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the start of a connection under the “normal” path, the DNS sniffer module does
not send the packet back to the host until the exception is successfully deployed
in the SDN network (or the VMM confirms there is already an exception with the
resolved IP). The rules are considered installed when the DNS sniffer module receives
a notification from the VMM. Lastly, the controller releases the DNS response packet
back to the host, and the transmission starts making use of the deployed exception
path. Note that the extra DNS processing adds an additional delay to the delivery
of DNS response packets. However, we observed that processing each DNS packet
takes less than 500 milliseconds in the worst case, which is significantly less than the
default timeout of 5 seconds applications use to reissue another DNS request to the
DNS server.
By pairing rclone with an SDN-enabled VIP Lanes campus network and tun-
ing the rclone parameters (e.g. number of parallel transfers, chunk size), researchers
are able to obtain significantly better throughput from end system nodes, sometimes
comparable to the performance from the DTN, even from dedicated server nodes and
desktop nodes deep in the campus network to remote storage systems that dynami-
cally change their IP addresses using moving target practices.
5.5.3 Experiment Setup
For this set of experiments two more source nodes were added and are shown in
Fig. 5.11 as Aztec Desktop and Flint Server. The characteristics of the nodes are as
follows:
• Flint Server: A server machine with a high-speed path (and fewer hops) to the
Internet. It has a high-end processor (an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650L v3) with
48 cores running at 1.80GHz, 180 GB of RAM, and a 10 Gbps network interface
with jumbo frames (i.e. MTU 9000) enabled.
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• Aztec Desktop: A desktop workstation in a computer laboratory running Ubuntu
16.04. The node has an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4570S processor with 4 cores running
at 2.90GHz, 8 GB of RAM, a 1 Gbps network interface with jumbo frames enabled.
Figure 5.11: Location of source nodes in campus network
The datasets used for the experiment have varying file sizes and number of
files. Specifically, three datasets, each consisting of one single file varying in size: 1GB,
10GB, and 100GB. In addition, each of the files was divided into 10 and 50 equally-
sized files using the split command line utility to obtain six additional datasets, for
a total of nine data sets.
The datasets were uploaded from all three locations (i.e. Aztec Desktop, Flint
Server, and DTN) to Google Drive 4 times and downloaded from Google Drive to
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these locations also 4 times. The throughput was recorded once the transmission
finished. For every push and pull operation, the numbers of parallel connections (4,
8, 16 or 32) and chunk size parameters (4 MB, 8 MB, 16 MB and 32MB) were changed
as well. Due to the 750GB upload limit per account imposed by Google Drive, the
tests for the 100 GB data sets were limited to only 16 and 32 transfers.
5.5.4 Results
Viplanes Boost: By enabling high-speed paths for big data science flows, servers
can, at least in some cases, achieve speeds close to their maximum capacity and often
similar to speeds obtained on the high-end DTN node which are sufficient to move
big data to a cloud storage system very quickly. For example, as shown in Table 5.3,
some of the measurements recorded speeds greater than 700 Mbps from the Aztec
Desktop machine, which is approaching the theoretical maximum of 1 Gbps, and is
about 5-7x faster than going through the normal campus network (∼100-150 Mbps),
and orders of magnitude faster than the speeds recorded by others [136] (∼600 KB/s
in the best case) when moving data to other cloud storage systems from a campus
machine.
Table 5.3: Upload and download speeds by location (in Mbps)
Location-Dir Mean Std Dev Maximum
Aztec Desktop-up 395 159 734
DTN-up 854 903 5664
Flint Server-up 437 381 2164
Aztec Desktop-down 385 176 768
DTN-down 1839 1226 5204
Flint Server-down 1420 799 3986
Chunk Size: When uploading large files, it is often useful to chunk the file
into multiple smaller pieces as retransmissions incur in less overhead ( in case of
retransmission only a small piece is retransmitted). rclone allows the user to specify
the size of each generated chunk to be loaded in memory by the thread in charge
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of transmitting the file. Fig. 5.12 shows six summary statistics (i.e. minimum, first
quartile, median, mean, third quartile, and maximum) for throughput (in Mbps) for
4 different chunk sizes for the DTN, Flint Server, and Aztec Desktop. Based on the
figure, we can observe that the mean values increase with chunk size. Increasing the
chunk size, however, had less impact on throughput than increasing the number of
parallel transfers. For example, for the DTN, when the the chunk size changes from
4, to 8, to 16 and then to 32 MB, the mean throughput changes from 556, to 727,
to 1046 and then to 1062 Mbps, respectively, whereas when the number of parallel
transfers changes from 4, to 8, to 16 and then to 32, the mean throughput changes
from 425, to 651, to 1077, and then to 1187 Mbps, respectively.
Figure 5.12: Upload speed by chunk size (log scale)
Parallel Connections and Number of Cores: Tools that were able to
create multiple parallel connections yielded better performance in all storage systems.
The connections parameter is particularly important if one wants to take advantage
of the core count found in high-end machines (e.g., the DTN). As seen in Fig. 5.13,
using a lower number of threads than the number of cores produces slower speeds for
the capabilities of the source node. The influence of this parameter is more noticeable




Figure 5.13: Throughput by number of connections (log scale)
maximum throughput from the Flint Server while pushing data to Google Drive
measured 617 Mbps, 1013 Mbps, 1608 Mbps, and 2164 Mbps when increasing the
number of parallel transfers from 4 to 8 to 16 to 32 respectively. A similar behavior
can be seen while analyzing the DTN as both nodes have >= 32 cores.
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5.6 Final Remarks
In this chapter we presented a new approach towards security enforcement based
on the observation that policy exceptions provide the means for network users and
network providers to collaboratively deploy legitimate network configurations tai-
lored to specific workflows. Short-lived, on-demand, fine-grained exceptions provide
an opportunity for trusted (and authenticated) users to provide context about their
traffic using a structured markup language, and in return get special treatment from
network providers. The approach significantly improves on the current manual and
time-consuming procedure users have to go through to request a policy exception for
their dynamic workflows on campus that allow static exceptions (noting that many
do not provide exceptions of any sort). Further, we described how new advances in
programmable networks enable the possibility to develop control software that can
(1) create trust relationships via delegation of the network flowspace across localized
network providers, and (2) automate the deployment of an exception by reconfiguring
the network to satisfy the needs of the user. We described a prototype implementa-
tion of the security exception mechanism to improve the high-speed big-data transfer
in our campus network, what measures were taken to secure the system, and how we
were able to lock-down exceptions to individual flows following the principle of least
privilege. Our experimental results demonstrate that the transfer rate of trusted users
can be improved significantly when on-demand exceptions allow them to bypass mid-
dleboxes which can remain as the mechanism to enforce policies on general-purpose
traffic.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Dissertation Summary
This dissertation described systems and concepts that address problems associated
with the definition, deployment, and enforcement of network security policies and
their exceptions on campus networks. We introduced PoLanCO, a human-readable
language that allows network operators to write technically-precise statements that
are further translated into device configurations without network operator interven-
tion. We presented the building blocks of PoLanCO including the emerging Software-
Defined Networking architecture, state-of-the-art decision systems used in business
management (Business Rule Management System), and a Drools translation function
T (w) that transforms human-readable words into valid executable code. We pre-
sented a series of examples where operators can write PoLanCO statements derived
from imprecise Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) documents. Moreover, we showed that
the derived PoLanCO statements can enforce policies at various locations of a campus
network. We also described the concept of Network Security Caps (NSCs), a security
policy enforcement layer embedded in network devices (e.g. switches, routers) that
does policy compliance checks on incoming network traffic prior to regular device
packet forwarding. In order to achieve a seamless deployment that does not disrupt
ongoing communications, we realized NSCs via OpenFlow-hybrid devices that sup-
port the NORMAL port. We showed that NSCs separate policy enforcement from
end system and device functionality. Consequently, NSCs can help protect against
server misconfigurations that might introduce policy violations and security exploits
in the network. Lastly, we proposed a novel approach towards network security based
on the notion of trusted on-demand security exceptions. We developed a system that
brings network providers and users together in order to dynamically adapt the net-
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work to user-specific workflows. On one hand, providers get to know what users
are doing in the network because users share information about their traffic. On the
other, users get a preferred treatment for (some of) their flows when they justify their
need for an exception to network providers. Our experiments indicated that short-
lived fine-grained security exceptions improve the throughput of researcher workflows
by more than an order of magnitude.
6.2 Future Work
The systems introduced in this work to improve the definition, enforcement, and
management of network security policies can be extended in the following ways:
PoLanCO Policy Management Extensions: The Policy Language for Campus
Operations (PoLanCO) presented in Chapter 3 leverages basic features of
the Drools Business Rule Management System to write human-readable and
technically-precise statements. At present, PoLanCO statements do not
support more complex policy management features such as policy scheduling
or distributed policy definition. The language/grammar of PoLanCO can be
extended to include additional Drools-specific “rule attributes” that provide
enhanced business rule management. For example, the attribute date-effective
could allow a policy rule to be activated in the future (e.g. scheduling revised
student-related policies effective at the start of the next semester); likewise,
date-expires could be used to specify the times when a policy cannot be active
(e.g. forbid all access to a server during maintenance windows); and lastly, the
attribute agenda-group could be incorporated to control the order of execution
of groups of PoLanCO statements (e.g. IT policies are enforced first, then
departmental policies, and lastly authorized exceptions).
Reverse Engineering Policies from Configurations: Section 3.4 described the
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translation pipeline (i.e. set of steps) that transforms an AUP-like document
(high-level) into executable Drools code that contacts SDN controllers to push
OpenFlow rules that enforce the policy (low-level).
With the introduction of PoLanCO as a middle-layer between low-level config-
urations and high-level policies, a bottom-up translation becomes feasible and
could be used for policy verification. For example, given the current state of
all NSCs rules in the network, it could attempt to construct the PoLanCO
statements that generated the rules. Then, the reverse engineered PoLanCO
statements could be compared with the original statements to verify if there is
a discrepancy that could pose a security risk to the network.
Enforcement Beyond OpenFlow: The described prototype systems leverage
SDN-capable networks and use OpenFlow as the principal mechanism for
policy enforcement. However, not all university campuses have (or allow
the deployment of) SDN-enabled equipment in their network infrastructure.
Instead, the concepts and systems introduced in this dissertation could be
adapted to other types of centralized systems that allow IT groups to push
configurations to several network devices. For example, Cisco’s Digital Network
Architecture [19] uses a controller to troubleshoot, configure, and manage
Cisco devices in a network (many campus networks use Cisco equipment across
their infrastructure). Likewise, access to Wireless Access Points controllers
could extend the capabilities of PoLanCO and on-demand security exceptions
to enforce policies on wireless equipment and connections.
Integration of Graph Database Queries: In the systems described in this work,
the Neo4j graph database stores network information about the discovered
topology. Besides traditional data storage, the prototype exception system ex-
ecutes Neo4j queries that compute three middlebox-free paths (i.e. the widest,
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the fastest and the shortest paths) for the installation of on-demand exceptions
for big data transfers. However, we argue that more queries can be constructed
to express various types of policies (or on-demand exceptions) due to the avail-
ability of a large amount of information about the network. For example, path
queries that avoid specific portions of the network such as finding a path from
the machines in a department X to the Internet such that traffic never goes
through the medical campus; querying all the nodes that can be reachable on a
particular VLAN; or enforcing paths that must go through a series of middle-
boxes (e.g. Firewalls, IDS/IPS, load balancers, etc.).
Traceability: The introduction of PoLanCO into the process that translates ac-
ceptable use policies into configurations allows for the use of natural language
processing tools and techniques to trace if an Acceptable Use Policy is repre-
sented in the PoLanCO statements.
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Appendix A Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
API Application Programming Interface
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
AS Autonomous System
AUP Acceptable Use Policy
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
BRMS Business Rule Management System
BYOD Bring Your Own Device
CIO Chief Information Officer
CLI Command-Line Interface
CTO Chief Technology Officer
CapEx Capital Expenditures
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DiffServ Differentiated Services
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
DSCP Differentiated Services Code Point
DSL Domain-Specific Language
DTN Data Transfer Node
ESpec Exception Specification
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GENI Global Environment for Network Innovations
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GUI Graphical User Interface
HPC High-Performance Computing
HTTPS HTTP over TLS
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
IBGP Internal Border Gateway Protocol
IDPS Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IPSec IP Security
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IS-IS Intermediate System to Intermediate System
ISP Internet Service Provider
IT Information Technology
IT Information Technology
IoT Internet of Things
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LLDP Link-Layer Discovery Protocol
NAT Network Address Translation
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NOS Network Operating System
NSC Network Security Cap
NSF National Science Foundation
OSD Object Storage Daemon
OSM Object Storage Monitor






PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
PWC Policy Writing Committee
QoS Quality-of-Service
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RAS Remote Access Server
RCP Routing Control Platform
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol
RIP Routing Information Protocol
SDK Software Development Kit
SDN Software-Defined Networking
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
STP Spanning-Tree Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
ToS Type of Service
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAP Wireless Access Point
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